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Foreword
Michigan continues to face serious economic conse
quences of the recessions and structural industrial changes of
recent years. None of them is more grim than the outpouring
of unemployment benefits to workers left jobless by these
events from an insolvent state unemployment insurance fund
that has had to be subsidized heavily by federal loans. The
time for repayment of these loans to begin is at hand, even as
the debt accumulates further.
How this problem developed, where it is heading if not
treated adequately, and what kinds of remedies are available
are the subjects of this monograph. The federal-state
unemployment insurance system is complex, but the
Michigan law has its own idiosyncracies. Overlaying it all is a
loan repayment process that further confounds understand
ing of the problem and how it may be handled. The author,
with long experience in the study of unemployment in
surance, has attempted to set forth a relatively concise yet
comprehensive treatment of the subject to assist Michigan's
policymakers as they formulate, evaluate, and eventually
decide upon courses of action. The Institute makes the
monograph available with the hope that it will bring some
light and understanding to a difficult and vexing problem.
Facts and observations presented are the sole responsibili
ty of the author. His viewpoints do not necessarily represent
the positions of the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research.
E. Earl Wright
Director

September 1982
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Preface
Many aspects of Michigan's unemployment insurance in
solvency problem and ideas for its treatment were subjects of
discussion at meetings of a Working Group of employer
representatives held during the first several months of 1982.
The group was appointed by the director of the state Depart
ment of Commerce to study the unemployment insurance
financing system and develop recommendations. Professor
Cynthia Rence of Michigan State University and this author
also participated in these meetings, as did staff of the Com
merce Department and the Michigan Employment Security
Commission.
It became apparent from those discussions that the
technical complexities of the program's financing structure,
of its insolvency, of the rules for debt repayment, and so on,
were so formidable that they could constitute in themselves a
barrier to developing agreement on a reasonable course to
pursue in dealing with the problem. For this reason, it seem
ed useful to attempt to assemble in one place an explanation
of the system, the existing insolvency problem—its
background and prospects—and some ideas for gaining con
trol over it. In doing so, my intent has been to illuminate the
subject with descriptive information and some objective
analysis to promote as much understanding as possible as a
basis for formulating policy beneficial to the state and fair to
all sides. If this effort makes some contribution towards that
end, it will have been worth it.

Several members of the Working Group made comments
on an early draft of this paper and these were helpful.
Significant comments by Professor Rence helped to clarify a
few important points, for which I am grateful. Most of all, I
must express my thanks to Thomas West of the Research and
Statistics Bureau of the Michigan Employment Security
Commission, who patiently responded to my endless ques
tions concerning data, federal and state provisions, projec
tions and changes in projections, and who read and com
mented on drafts of the paper. His help was invaluable. My
thanks go also to S. Martin Taylor, director of the Commis
sion, whose cooperation made possible the necessary
assistance of his staff.
Closer to home, credit must go to my secretary, Irene
Krabill, for her efficient and accurate "word processing" of
the manuscript through its various stages and the in
numerable changes that were made.
Any errors that remain in the paper are, of course, my
responsibility alone. Positions and viewpoints I have ex
pressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of
the Institute, of any state agency, of the employer Working
Group, or of any other interested party.
Saul J. Blaustein

KalamazoOy Michigan
September 1982
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Executive Summary
Without changes in Michigan's current unemployment in
surance (UI) law, the state's UI debt of $1.6 billion, as of
mid-1982, will probably rise to about $2.8 billion by the end
of 1983 and to $3.8 billion by the end of 1985. Interest
payments alone on these additional federal loans would
amount to hundreds of millions over these years. Despite
some slow, moderate decline, unemployment is likely to con
tinue relatively high in Michigan for the next several years.
Revenues produced by the state's existing UI tax structure
will not come close to paying for expected benefit outlays, let
alone repay any of the debt. Interest costs will have to be
covered from other funding sources. Beginning with the
federal UI payroll tax due for 1982, payable January 1983,
Michigan employers will have to pay an additional penalty
rate each year. The first penalty payment equals 0.3 percent
of taxable payrolls; the rate rises progressively by 0.3 annual
ly. Penalty tax proceeds, expected to total over $300 million
through 1985, apply toward reducing the outstanding debt.
The federal UI tax rates are uniform while state rates,
largely experience rated, vary from 1.0 to 9.0 percent.
Employers who provide relatively stable employment and ex
perience limited or no benefit charges against their accounts
enjoy low or minimum state tax rates. They object to sharing
equally, through the uniform federal penalty tax, in the pay
ment of the past excess costs of other employers that have
generated the debt. Many high-cost employers (nearly half of
Vll

all experience-rated accounts at mid-1981), such as firms in
auto manufacturing and construction, have not covered their
benefit charges because of limitations in the tax structure.
They feel, however, that to impose sharply increased state UI
taxes on them at this time would be discouraging to their
recovery efforts.
Some changes are seen as necessary in the existing state UI
program, at least to lessen if not curtail the need for further
borrowing, and eventually to reduce the debt and restore the
fund to a solvent position. The changes discussed are design
ed to increase revenues and lower benefit outlays. They in
clude increases in the taxable wage base from its present
$6,000 level, which now subjects only about a third of all
payrolls to the tax—the lowest proportion among the states.
A new employee tax is also reviewed, as are other tax
changes aimed at raising more revenues from high-cost
employers. Changes to reduce outlays include stiffening the
qualifying requirement for benefits, imposing a noncompensable waiting week, and freezing the maximum weekly
benefit amount payable at its present level instead of contin
uing its annual upward indexing by average wage level in
creases.
Using projections provided by the Michigan Employment
Security Commission in June 1982, the effects of these
changes on the fund are illustrated for the years 1983-1985.
Together, they add to a total effort of over $2 billion in in
creased taxes and reduced benefit outlays over this period.
Of the total, employer state tax increases account for about
54 percent, the new employee tax for about 16 percent, and
benefit reductions for about 30 percent. The debt would
peak in the first part of 1983 and then decline to about $1.7
billion by the end of 1985. Of the debt incurred after March
1982, which is subject to interest (earlier loans are not), only
about $500 million would remain.
Vlll

Changes in assumptions about unemployment, wage
trends, and other economic factors which underlie the pro
jections, and UI experience that deviates from past patterns
could and probably will produce results different from those
described. The projections, therefore, should be used only as
general guidelines for policy planning purposes.
In any case, the burdens to be faced in dealing with the in
solvency problem in Michigan are considerable and painful
to bear. Failure to take some remedial action, however, will
probably make the state's economic prospects more grim
and its business climate less attractive. Short-run federal
relief through some easing of repayment and interest provi
sions would be helpful. (The Tax Equity and Fiscal Respon
sibility Act of 1982 adopted by the Congress in August 1982
contains several changes along these lines.) Longer range
easing of state solvency problems in unemployment in
surance can be considered through some national pooling of
excess benefit costs by reinsurance or cost equalization
schemes, or by more federal sharing of benefits paid for
longer duration unemployment.
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Introduction
The Michigan unemployment insurance (UI) trust fund, as
of the end of July 1982, was in debt to the federal govern
ment for about $1.6 billion. High unemployment in the state
in recent years swelled UI benefit outlays to levels beyond the
revenue-generating capacity of the current state UI tax struc
ture. The result was the exhaustion of trust fund reserves and
the need to borrow federal funds in order to continue paying
unemployment benefits. Repayment of the debt and
rebuilding a solvent UI fund constitute a serious problem
with which the state must begin to cope in the immediate
future.
The gravity of the problem ahead for Michigan can hardly
be overstated, particularly given the state's current un
favorable economic climate and outlook. Under the present
UI law, the trust fund debt can be expected to grow con
siderably worse in the months and years ahead. Since UI
costs are essentially a burden to business, the state fund's in
solvency is perceived as a threat to the success of economic
recovery efforts in Michigan. How the problem is managed,
in turn, will depend on how well that recovery develops.
The past pattern of the state's economy has been one of
cyclical ups and downs. Concentration in durable goods
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manufacturing, heavily auto-related, has made employment
especially sensitive to national economic conditions. Falloff
in consumer demand for new cars has accompanied declines
or slowed growth in personal income and translated into
deep and widespread layoffs in Michigan. With recovery, the
turnaround has been equally dramatic. Outlays for
unemployment benefits in the state have followed this typical
boom and bust mold, and the financing of those benefits was
planned accordingly. During boom periods, however, trust
fund reserves did not build up to levels generally recom
mended as likely to ensure solvency, recommendations
which guided the UI financing policies of many states. While
recession rapidly depleted most of Michigan's benefit
reserves, vigorous recovery led to some rapid fund buildup,
enough to stave off fund insolvency in the next recession.
Unfortunately, that pattern broke down in the 1970s. The
major causes of this change, including the Arab oil embargo,
the gasoline shortages and price inflation, and the inroads of
foreign competition into American car markets, contributed
to diminished resiliency of the state's economy. Recovery
from recession has been less vigorous and less sustained than
before. A return to the former pattern is not expected, at
least in the foreseeable future. That prospect carries impor
tant long term implications for UI financing policy.
The immediate problem, however, is to deal with the pres
ent and growing UI debt. This paper presents the
background and dimensions of the problem, and discusses
some possible approaches for its treatment. After a descrip
tion of the general financing arrangements for UI, the tax
structure of the Michigan UI program and some of its
eligibility and benefit provisions, the paper reviews how the
debt developed, the current federal provisions for its repay
ment, and the present outlook for the years ahead. The ensu
ing discussion of potential courses of action comprises most
of the balance of the paper. Some longer term state and
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federal policy considerations with regard to financing and
solvency are noted briefly in concluding sections.
A few words are appropriate at this point about some of
the figures that will be used in the course of the paper. The
substance of this cautionary note will be repeated from time
to time by way of emphasis. Much of the discussion centers
eventually on measures that may be taken to deal with the
problem. Necessarily, the discussion must look ahead to how
the problem might develop and what effects the various
measures might have. In doing so, one has to develop what
are hoped to be reasonable scenarios about UI fund transac
tions—tax revenues, benefit outlays, loans, and
repayments—over the next several years under various cir
cumstances. For this purpose, the paper uses projections
made by technical staff of the Michigan Employment Securi
ty Commission (MESC). What is important to bear in mind
is that the numbers projected are not hard and fast predic
tions of the future. They are estimates based on conditions
and past behavioral relationships about which certain
assumptions are made that can and probably will be dif
ferent from actual experience in the coming period. As time
goes on and the experience begins to unfold, the projections
will be modified and refined. New projected figures will be
different from those used here, perhaps quite different in
some cases. Indeed, in the course of preparing this paper,
estimates based on earlier MESC projections were revised to
take account of unemployment levels in recent months that
were running higher than assumed earlier, and of other
unanticipated trends that affects the projections significant
ly.
The economic outlook for Michigan is currently a bleak
one, but it is also clouded in a great deal of uncertainty. The
same clouds shroud these estimates. Nevertheless, even
though the numbers will change, the general picture pro
jected and its major components serve as a useful framework
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within which to consider legislative policy alternatives. Hav
ing worked through the possibilities based on one set of pro
jections, it should be possible to sort out the implications of
subsequently revised and updated figures.

Financing of
Unemployment Insurance
Employers in Michigan are solely responsible for financ
ing unemployment insurance benefits paid under the state's
law, as is the case in all but three other states. 1 Currently, the
state UI tax on Michigan employers ranges between 1.0 and
9.0 percent of taxable wages, the first $6,000 paid to each
employee in a calendar year. The rate varies among
employers on the basis of their experience with unemploy
ment. New employers pay a standard rate of 2.7 percent for
the first two years, after which experience rating begins to in
troduce some variation. Taxes and payrolls estimated for
1981 in Michigan indicated an average tax rate of about 4
percent of taxable payrolls, or about 1.3 percent of total
payrolls. 2 For 1982, these rates are expected to average about
the same. The estimated 1982 average tax rate for Michigan,
on the basis of total payrolls, is above the national average,
but lower than the average rates expected in 19 states. (Table
1.)

State UI taxes paid are deposited in a state account main
tained in the Unemployment Trust Fund in the U.S.
Treasury. Each state has such an account. The Michigan ac
count represents the trust fund reserves for benefits payable

Financing Unemployment Insurance

Table 1
States Arrayed by Estimated Average Unemployment
Insurance Tax Rate for 1982 Based on Total Wages
State
Puerto Ricob
Rhode Island5
West Virginia5
Alaska
Kentucky5
Oregon
Washington
New Jersey5
Pennsylvania5
Virgin Islands5
North Dakota
Vermont5

Wyoming
Arkansas5
Idaho
Illinois5
Massachusetts
Mississippi
Montana
Maine5
MICHIGAN5
District of Columbia*3

Hawaii
Iowa
Indiana
Kansas
Minnesota5
New York
Ohio5
Utah

Tax
rate3
3.0
2.3
2.1
2.0
1.9
1.7
1.7
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.3
1.3
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1

State

Tax
rate3

Wisconsin5

1.1

UNITED STATES

1.1

California
Delaware5
Louisiana
Nevada
Tennessee
Alabama
New Mexico
South Carolina
Connecticut5

1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.8

Maryland
South Dakota
Virginia
Nebraska
North Carolina
Colorado
New Hampshire
Georgia
Arizona
Florida

0.8
0.8
0.8
0.7
0.7
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.4

Oklahoma
Texas

0.4
0.3

Missouri5

SOURCE: Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 22-82, June 7, 1982, U.S.
Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Office of Legislation
and Actuarial Services.
a. Percent of total wages, as estimated by the states early in 1982.
b. State trust fund in debt as of June 30, 1982.
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to the state's insured unemployed workers. These reserves
may be used only for the payment of benefits or for the
repayment of loans made to pay benefits. Funds are
withdrawn to pay benefits, as needed, and tax revenues are
deposited when collected.
Ideally, each state manages its UI finances so that suffi
cient reserves accumulate to handle benefit needs as they
arise. Because of varying economic conditions, benefit needs
can and do fluctuate widely over time. To remain solvent,
the state's trust fund reserves must be ample to withstand a
sudden heavy drain brought on by a steep rise in unemploy
ment with its attendant soaring benefit costs, as occurs in
recession periods. With few exceptions, state funds managed
to remain solvent over the years, until the 1970s. 3 In that
decade, in which two recessions occurred, insolvency became
widespread. From 1972 through the end of June 1982, a total
of 29 states exhausted their benefit reserves and required
loans to continue the payment of benefits. Most, including
Michigan, first borrowed in 1975 or 1976. As of June 30,
1982, 19 of these states were in debt for a total of $7.8
billion. (Table 2.)
Besides the state UI tax, employers pay a federal UI tax.
Specified under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act
(FUTA), this tax currently applies also to the first $6,000 of
wages paid to employees each year. The FUTA tax rate is 3.4
percent. 4 A credit of 2.7 percent is allowed against the full
federal tax, however, to employers in states with approved
UI laws. 5 The net federal tax therefore is 0.7 percent of tax
able wages, a uniform rate payable by all private, for-profit
employers throughout the country. 6 Revenues raised by the
0.7 percent net tax go into federal accounts in the Unemploy
ment Trust Fund to finance UI administrative expenses, 7 the
federal share of extended benefit costs, 8 and a federal loan
fund from which states borrow if their own reserves are
depleted. The loan fund was established in 1954. Provisions

Table 2
Loans to States from Federal Loan Fund for Unemployment Insurance
1972 through June 30,1982
(millions)
State

Year
first
borrowed

Latest
year
borrowed

In debt— June 30, 1982
Arkansas .............
Connecticut ...........
Delaware .............
District of Columbia . . .
Illinois ...............
Kentucky .............
Maine ................
Michigan .............
Minnesota ............
Missouri ..............

1976
1972
1975
1975
1975
1981
1975
1975
1975
1982

1981
1978
1982
1979
1982
1982
1978
1982
1982
1982

New Jersey ...........
Ohio .................
Pennsylvania ..........
Puerto Rico ...........
Rhode Island ..........

1975
1977
1975
1975
1975

1978
1982
1982
1978
1980

Amount
outstanding
6/30/82
$

64.0
272.0
55.5
41.7
1,634.1
104.3
21.3
1,587.5
209.8
89.8
525.6
1,068.2
1,608.7
66.4
102.0

Amount
repaid by
6/30/82
$

30.0
242.0
16.2
31.8
191.8
15.1
624.0
172.0
209.4
1.9
305.6
22.3
27.3
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for borrowing and repayment have been amended often.
Loans made before April 1, 1982 and still outstanding are
interest-free; loans made from that date on do bear interest.

The Michigan UI Tax Structure
The state's present UI tax is made up of three components,
each contributing to the overall tax rate assigned to each
employer. These include:
(1) A chargeable benefit component (CBC)—a rate rang
ing from 0 to 6.0 percent based on experience as measured by
the employer's benefit ratio, i.e., benefits charged to an in
dividual employer's account over the last five years taken as
a percent of that employer's taxable payrolls in those years.
(2) An account building component (ABC)—a rate rang
ing from 0 to 2.0 percent based on the balance in an
employer's account (all past benefits charged less all taxes
paid, excluding NEC taxes—see below) compared with what
the balance should be to meet a minimum solvency standard.
The extent to which the employer's account balance falls
below its required minimum solvency level is calculated, and
a fraction or multiple of 0.25 of this deficiency is divided by
the employer's total payroll for the year. The result is taken
as the ABC rate for the tax year, up to the maximum of 2.0
percent. 9 Although calculated as a percent of total payroll,
the ABC rate is applied to taxable payroll.
(3) A nonchargeable benefit component (NBC)—a
uniform tax rate, currently at its maximum level of 1.0 per
cent, to cover certain pooled costs, including benefit costs of
employers who go into bankruptcy and the state share of ex
tended benefit costs. 10
All component tax rates apply to a state taxable wage base
of $6,000. The total combined rate ranges from 1.0 to 9.0
percent. The first two components—the CBC and
ABC—represent the experience-rated portion of the tax.
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Two other details about the tax structure should be noted.
With regard to the CBC and ABC rates, whenever the com
bined total of these rates equals or exceeds 4.0 percent, the
amount of any increase in the tax rate from one year to the
next is limited to 0.5 of a percentage point even though the
experience rate calculations would call for a larger increase.
There is no limit on rate reduction. Another special provi
sion allows a credit against the NBC rate for half the rate in
crease in the FUTA tax imposed for debt repayment (see
"Repayment Provisions" in chapter 3). Thus, a FUTA rate
increase of 0.3 paid in one year would reduce the following
year's NBC rate by 0.15, a 0.6 rate increase would reduce it
by 0.3, and so on.
The existing state UI tax structure and taxable wage base
were established in 1978. Table 3 shows what that structure
has produced in recent years. Clearly, the taxes generated in
1980 and 1981 fell far short of benefit outlay levels in those
years. With no reserves available, the shortfall created the
need for substantial borrowing.

State Eligibility and Benefit Provisions
On the eligibility and benefit side of the program, the
following provisions are important to the discussion of
various possibilities available for dealing with the insolvency
problem:
(1) To qualify for any benefits, a claimant must have
worked, during a 52-week base period preceding the first
claim, in at least 18 weeks with earnings of no less than $67
in each week (20 times the minimum hourly wage of $3.35).
(2) There is no waiting week—benefits are payable for the
first valid week of unemployment claimed.
(3) The weekly benefit amount (WBA) payable is 70 per
cent of the claimant's average weekly wage earned in the
base period, less any income and social security taxes ap-

12
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plicable, up to a maximum WBA equal to 58 percent of the
statewide average weekly wage in covered employment. The
current maximum WBA is $197.

Table 3
Selected Unemployment Insurance
Financial Data for Michigan
1979-1981©
1978

1979

1980

1981

Total payrolls (billions)

$41.9

$45.4

$44.6

$47.5(E)

Taxable payrolls (billions)b

$17.1

$17.6

$16.4

$16(E)

Percent of total
payrolls taxable

41%

39%

37%

34%(E)

4.11%

4.03%

3.73%

4%(E)

Total taxes collected
(millions)

$691

$724

$618

$624

Total benefit outlays,
including state share
of extended
benefits (millions)

$424

$618

$1,293

$1,065

Item

Average employer tax rate
(percent of taxable
payrolls)

SOURCE: Handbook of Unemployment Insurance Program Statistics, Michigan Employ
ment Security Commission, Bureau of Research and Statistics, pp. 2, 35, and 44.
(E) = Estimated.
a. Data for private, contributing employers covered by the Michigan Employment Security
Act.
b. Based on taxable wage base of $6,000.

(4) Regular benefits are payable for from 13.5 weeks to a
maximum of 26 weeks of unemployment on the basis of 3
weeks of benefits for 4 weeks of employment in the base
period.
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(5) Extended benefits are payable during periods of high
unemployment in the state and add 50 percent to the clai
mant's regular benefit duration entitlement, up to a combin
ed maximum of 39 weeks. Extended benefits have been
payable in Michigan because of its high rate of insured
unemployment. (The federal government covers half the cost
of extended benefits paid to claimants with at least 20 weeks
of base-period employment, but will not cover costs for the
first week if the state has no waiting week for regular
benefits.)
(6) Claimants who quit their jobs without good cause or
are discharged for misconduct are disqualified; they may
draw no benefits until after they have worked long enough to
earn at least a minimum amount of wages and then are
subsequently laid off under nondisqualifying conditions.
Provisions (1), (3), and (6) were enacted in 1980, but for
only a limited period. They expire March 31, 1983, after
which earlier provisions are to be restored. These are:
(1) A minimum requirement of 14 weeks of work with
earnings of at least $25.01 per week.
(3) A WBA equal to 60 percent of the claimant's gross
average weekly wage up to a maximum, based on the number
of dependents claimed, ranging from $97 for claimants with
no dependents to $136 for those with four or more
dependents.
(6) Disqualifications for voluntary quits and misconduct
discharges suspend benefits for 13 weeks, with a comparable
reduction in duration entitlement; benefits may be drawn for
unemployment after the suspension period ends.

The Michigan UI Debt
and Its Outlook
Past and Recent Borrowing
Michigan qualified for and drew a federal loan of $113
million early in 1958, although its own reserves, apart from
the borrowed funds, never did run out completely at that
time. Since no interest was charged and repayments were not
required to begin until more than four years had elapsed
after the loan was made, repayments did not begin until
1963. 11 The debt was fully liquidated in 1967.
The recession of the mid-1970s was a severe one, hitting
Michigan hard. By early 1975, the state's benefit reserves
were exhausted and borrowing began. Over the next two
years, the debt accumulated to a total of $624 million.
Repayment was not required until November 1980. If not
repaid by then, debt reduction was to take place through a
series of increases in the FUTA net tax rate on Michigan
employers. During the late 1970s, the state's economy ex
perienced fairly good recovery. Benefit outlays declined well
below 1975 levels, while expanded employment and payrolls
combined with increased UI tax rates to rebuild the fund to a
level where it was possible to repay the entire debt. In
December 1979, the debt was repaid in full. 12
15
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During the latter part of 1979, however, the Michigan
economy was again deteriorating. As benefit outlays rose
sharply early in 1980, remaining benefit reserves were
depleted quickly and borrowing from the federal loan fund
resumed. Such borrowing has continued off and on since
then, as unemployment has remained high. By the end of
March 1982, the debt had grown to $1,563 million, none of
which was subject to interest. Additional substantial borrow
ing is expected in the second half of 1982 and thereafter. The
interest payable on debt incurred after March 31, 1982 is an
obligation of the state but may not be paid from UI trust
fund reserves.

Repayment Provisions13
Federal rules currently in effect call for repayment of the
Michigan UI debt by November 1982. If it is not repaid by
then, progressive increases in the FUTA tax rate are imposed
each year on Michigan employers, the proceeds of which go
to reduce the outstanding debt. 14 The net federal tax rate of
0.7 percent will rise by a 0.3 "penalty rate" to 1.0 percent of
1982 taxable payrolls, due for payment in January 1983, and
by a 0.6 rate to 1.3 percent for 1983, payable January 1984.
It will increase by a 0.9 penalty rate for 1984 payrolls and by
1.2 for 1985, to a total FUTA rate for that year of 1.9 per
cent. If the FUTA increase for 1985 does not eliminate all of
the remaining debt, then an additional tax, through a
"solvency rate" increase, will be imposed for that year, up
to as much as another 1.5 percent of taxable wages. 15 The
total federal tax payable, combining the penalty and solven
cy rates with the basic net rate of 0.7 percent, could therefore
equal the maximum 3.4 percent of taxable payrolls in 1985
and later years, involving the loss of all of the federal tax
credit normally allowed. The proceeds of the FUTA tax in
creases apply to reduce the outstanding loans in the order
they were made, i.e., the oldest unpaid loans are retired first.
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That means that the interest-free portion of the debt will be
repaid first through this process.
At any time, of course, the state may accelerate the rate of
debt repayment. One incentive for doing so is to reduce the
liability for interest. As debt incurred after March 31, 1982
increases, so will the interest that will be payable. Any
repayments made from the state fund apply to the latest
loans made which do bear interest. Another incentive for
faster repayment is to limit, as far as possible, the FUTA rate
increases which are imposed on all Michigan employers. A
major concern with these increases is their effect on new
employers who pay a standard state UI tax rate of 2.7 per
cent for the first two years. Combined with the federal rate,
the total state and federal tax for new employers will pro
bably go to 4.3 percent for 1984 and could go as high as 6.1
percent of taxable wages for 1985. Efforts to attract new in
dustry to Michigan would be hampered by the increasingly
discouraging disincentive of loading new employers with a
repayment burden for past UI debt to which they had not
contributed. To the extent that some FUTA increases may be
unavoidable, some other type of relief for new employers
may be needed.
Another concern with the uniform FUTA increases is that
they tend to nullify much of the desired effect of experience
rating, which appears to be strongly favored by the employer
community in the state. All employers would share the debt
repayment burden equally, in relation to their taxable
payrolls, through the FUTA tax rate method of repayment,
regardless of wide variations among them in their past
benefit charges. To the extent that experience rating con
tinues as a preferred policy in Michigan, the emphasis is on
raising more of the necessary funds for repayment through
the state's UI tax structure, particularly through its
experience-rating components, than through uniform federal
tax increases. 16
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Amendments enacted in 1981 of the federal repayment
provisions made it possible for a debtor state to qualify its
employers for a ceiling or "cap" at 0.6 on the FUTA rate in
crease imposed for repayment purposes, or at a higher level
of increase. For example, if the qualifying conditions are
met, the 0.6 rate increase applicable for Michigan employers
for the 1983 taxable year would apply for subsequent years
(through 1987), or the 0.9 increase for 1984 could hold at
that level for the next three years. To qualify for a cap after
1983, the following conditions must be met:
(1) No action is taken after August 1981 that reduces the
state's UI tax effort.
(2) No action is taken after August 1981 that reduces the
solvency of the state's fund, such as legislating benefit in
creases without compensating tax increases.
(3) The outstanding debt as of September 30 of the year
for which the federal tax cap applies is not larger than the
balance outstanding three years before. (For a 0.6 cap on the
increase for 1984 in Michigan, for example, the debt balance
on September 30 that year may not exceed the $1,015 million
balance outstanding on September 30, 1981.)
(4) The average state UI tax ratio for the year of the
federal tax cap is not less than the average of annual benefitcost ratios of the five preceding years. (For this purpose, the
average state tax ratio is total taxes paid into the state fund
as a percent of total payrolls of taxable employers, and the
annual benefit-cost ratio is total benefits paid out of the state
fund during the year plus interest paid on loans as a percent
of total payrolls for the year.)
At this time, qualifying for a cap on the FUTA increases ap
pears to be remote as a possibility for Michigan, certainly at
the 0.6 level. A 0.9 cap in 1985 may not be out of reach en
tirely, but it would be very difficult to achieve under condi
tions now foreseen.
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The Outlook—Increasing Debt
Given current economic expectations and no changes in
existing UI provisions, the prospects are for substantially
more borrowing by the state fund over the next several years.
Recent estimates made by the Michigan Employment Securi
ty Commission (MESC) show a continuing shortfall in state
UI tax revenues during the 1982-85 period when benefit
outlay projections range between $1.4 and $1.8 billion each
year, while state tax revenues total less than $900 million an
nually. The projected total shortfall over these four years is
over $3 billion, carrying the debt to more than $3.8 billion by
the end of 1985 even after taking account of repayments
made through FUTA tax increases in this period.
Projections of UI finances for years ahead are necessarily
speculative. They are based on certain assumptions and past
experience patterns which are subject to change. As explain
ed in the Introduction of this paper, projected data should
therefore be viewed with caution and understood as tentative
approximations that can be useful for general guidance of
policy considerations. New experience and changed assump
tions can be expected to bring about modified projections
from time to time, as has occurred recently.
One of the most important assumptions underlying the
projections is the expected rate of unemployment in the
state. Using estimates made in December 1981 by another of
fice in the state's Department of Labor, earlier projections
by MESC had assumed annual average unemployment rates
for Michigan for the next five years as follows: 17
1985 -9.7%
1982- 13.1%
1986-9.4%
1983 - 11.7%
1984 - 10.7%
It was also assumed that average wage levels in the state
would rise by 7 percent each year, and that current UI tax,
eligibility, and benefit provisions would continue, including
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those enacted in 1980 as temporary. Using these assump
tions, and a model reflecting existing state and federal provi
sions and past experience patterns, MESC provided, in early
1982, projected annual data for several years on payrolls,
benefit outlays, state tax revenues, and PUTA tax increases
for debt repayment. The level of the state fund (or outstand
ing debt) at the end of each year was also projected.
As a result of actual experience in the early months of 1982
and more data becoming available about 1981 experience,
MESC adjusted these earlier estimates and provided new
projections in June 1982. Unemployment has been running
at rates higher than expected and may average around 14
percent in 1982. At the same time, larger proportions than
usual of the insured unemployed had earned wages high
enough to qualify for the maximum or near-maximum week
ly benefit amounts. They have also been drawing benefits for
longer periods, on average, than foreseen. These factors
together called for upward adjustments of the earlier projec
tions of annual benefit outlays. Moreover, the recessiondepressed payrolls reported by employers have been totaling
less than anticipated, leading to lower tax collections than
expected. Downward adjustments were therefore applied to
the earlier revenue projections. The combined effect of these
adjustments has been to widen the estimated gap between
fund outlays and revenues and greatly increase the amount
of borrowing likely to be needed.
Table 4 summarizes these revised estimates for the years
1982 to 1985, assuming no changes in the existing state UI
program or in relevant federal provisions. The estimates
show that by the end of 1982, the debt will reach $2.2 billion.
A year later, it may exceed $2.8 billion, and then climb to
over $3 billion and reach towards $4 billion by the end of
1985. Despite moderate declines assumed in the unemploy
ment rates over this period, benefit outlays are expected to
increase each year after 1983 because of the continued index-
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Table 4
Michigan Unemployment Insurance Fund Transactions
and Debt: Projections under Current Law Provisions
1982-1985
Estimated3
__________Item projected_____________(in millions)
Fund balance (negative)—December 31, 1981
($l,075)b
1982: Benefit outlays0
Employer state taxes
Fund balance (negative)—December 31, 1982
1983: Benefit outlaysc
Employer state taxes
FUTA penalty tax payment (0.3 percent
of 1982 taxable payrolls)
Fund balance (negative)—December 31, 1983
1984: Benefit outlays0
Employer state taxes (net)d
FUTA penalty tax payment (0.6 percent
of 1983 taxable payrolls)
Fund balance (negative)—December 31, 1984
1985: Benefit outlays0
Employer state taxes (net)d
FUTA penalty tax payment (0.9 percent
of 1984 taxable payrolls)
Fund balance (negative)—December 31, 1985

(1,773)
644
($2,204)
(1,427)
770
48
($2,813)
(1,507)
855
102
($3,363)
(1,535)
892
162
($3,844)

NOTE: Figures within parentheses represent negative fund balances or subtractions from
the fund.
a. Based on data supplied by Michigan Employment Security Commission, June 1982.
b. Represents actual indebtedness.
c. Includes state share of extended benefit costs.
d. Net of tax credit allowed against the NBC rate for half the FUTA penalty rate paid in
previous year.
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ed rise in the weekly benefit ceiling. 18 Projected state tax
revenues reach higher levels each year as employment ex
pands and many employers are assigned higher tax rates, but
the revenue increases are restrained by the unchanging tax
able wage base and by the limiter on annual tax rate in
creases. Moreover, beginning in 1984, tax credits for part of
the FUTA penalty taxes paid provide increasingly larger off
sets to state taxes.
The FUTA penalty taxes provide the major new element
and are expected to total over $300 million in this period.
The credits allowed on the NEC rates for the penalty tax
payments made in the prior years would offset somewhat
over half. The FUTA tax increase projected for 1985,
payable in January 1986 and therefore not reflected on Table
4, combines a 1.2 percent penalty rate with a 1.5 percent
maximum solvency rate to yield a total of almost $500
million. The credit for this payment would offset the entire
1.0 percent NEC tax for 1987.
Also not shown on the table, since it is not paid from the
trust fund, is the interest liability relating to funds borrowed
after March 31, 1982. While very little interest is expected to
be paid in 1982, the amount due in 1983 is estimated at about
$84 million. While not estimated for later years, it is clear
that the interest liability will rise steeply with the debt in
creases that have been projected.
Beyond 1985, projections become very tenuous and
unreliable. One could perhaps speculate, however, that even
if unemployment were to continue a moderate decline, as
long as the UI program remained unchanged, it would prob
ably take another ten years or so to pay off the debt, largely
through the uniform FUTA tax which would continue at its
maximum level. That scenario is not a realistic one, however.
To expect unemployment to moderate and hold steadily to
lower levels for so many years is not a reasonable way to
view the future. With no reserve surplus, any kind of a reces-
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sion in these years would see Michigan borrowing heavily
again. Neither is it reasonable to expect so many years to go
by without changes in the UI program at both the state and
federal levels.

The Outlook—Higher Taxes
The average Michigan employer faces rising UI taxes in
coming years, even without changes in state tax provisions.
As the high benefit outlays of the early 1980s increasingly
dominate the five-year experience base used for calculating
the chargeable benefit component of the state tax, the rates
for many employers can only move upwards. Projections in
dicate that under the current law, the average state tax rate
may rise from about 4 percent in 1981 to over 5 percent by
1985. The NBC tax credit for part of the FUTA penalty tax
increase, however, would lower the 1985 net state tax rate to
about 5 percent. Around the average, of course, tax rates
vary considerably among employers because of experience
rating.
A major division among employers is between those with
negative and those with positive account balances. 19 At
mid-1980 about 4 out of 10 employers had negative account
balances; a year later, the proportion was nearly half.
Negative account employers are mostly of two kinds. One
type, such as found in construction and tourism, has signifi
cant seasonal operations followed by large layoffs about the
same time every year. Employers of this type are always, or
almost always, in a negative balance position, and are assign
ed at or near maximum tax rates. They include both highwage and low-wage paying employers. The other type in
cludes employers who are highly sensitive to recession condi
tions, such as firms engaged in durable goods manufactur
ing. Many are very large firms which pay high wages;
automobile manufacturers are the leading examples. Since
1970, the proportion of all employers with negative balances
has grown from about 20 percent to near 50 percent, mainly
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because of the impact of several recessions over these years.
At mid-1981, all negative balances aggregated almost $1.5
billion, more than the amount of the fund's debt at that
time. The state's UI tax structure has not been very effective
in recouping as much of these heavy charges as one might ex
pect considering the high maximum tax rate. 20 In 1981, fewer
than 6 percent of all employers were at the 9.0 maximum
rate; less than 10 percent had rates of 7.5 or higher. The
largest concentration of taxable payrolls clustered at tax
rates around the 5 percent level. The 0.5 limit on year-to-year
rate increases has prevented greater concentration at higher
rates. Among broad industry groupings, the UI tax rates in
1981 averaged highest in construction (6.3 percent), followed
by manufacturing and mining (4.7 percent in each); finance,
insurance, and real estate employers had the lowest average
rate (2.6 percent). 21
The federal net tax rate, currently at 0.7 percent, will rise
as the rate increases for debt repayment are added. The total
federal tax rate to be paid will be 1.3 for 1983, 1.6 for 1984,
and could jump to as high as 3.4 percent for 1985, barring
any efforts to accelerate debt repayment or a more rapid
decline in unemployment than projected. After allowing for
credits against the state tax rate for half the FUTA rate in
creases, up to the 1.0 percent limit of the NBC rate, the com
bined average state and federal tax rate could rise from
about 4.6 percent in 1981 to about 8.4 percent by 1985, based
on current projections. It is important to bear in mind the
assumption for these projections that the taxable wage base
will continue at $6,000, for both state and federal tax rates.
On the basis of projected total wages, the combined average
state-federal tax rate could rise from approximately 1.5 per
cent in 1981 to about 2.3 percent in 1985. However one
chooses to look at the problem, it represents a growing
burden for Michigan employers generally.
Michigan's competitive position, vis-a-vis other states, in
attracting new business and keeping the business it has is
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widely perceived as poor, although this view tends to be ex
aggerated. 22 High UI taxes are cited often as a negative fac
tor in that connection. The outlook for continued high
unemployment rates in the state and for mounting UI debt
and taxes offers no relief from that perception. The
discouraging effect of loading FUTA debt repayment in
creases on new employers was noted earlier. Firms which
tend to have favorable UI cost experience and thereby
qualify for low state rates would see their federal tax rates
rise regardless, swamping the effects of experience rating.
The state tax credits allowed for half the federal rate in
creases help to moderate that result, but not for new
employers in their first years under the program. By itself,
the existence of a serious and worsening insolvency problem
with no plan yet in hand for dealing with it may be the most
disturbing aspect of the state's UI program because of the
uncertainties it poses about future costs for prospective new
and expanding businesses.

State UI Program Changes
to Reduce Insolvency
These grim prospects call for serious consideration of
possible changes in existing state UI provisions that might
ease the burden, distribute it more equitably, reduce its un
favorable effects, and at least begin the effort needed to
bring the problem under control. The best solution of all, of
course, would be a rapid and vigorous recovery of the
economy. Short of that, however, there are some helpful,
though painful, actions that can be taken in the form of in
creasing tax revenues or reducing benefit outlays, or a com
bination of the two.

Alternatives and Goals
At one extreme, of course, the state can decide to take no
action with respect to its existing UI law. The only provision
it needs to make is for financing the interest that will be
payable on the debt. Without any other action, the tem
porary UI amendments adopted in late 1980 will sunset at the
end of March 1983 and the former provisions will again ap
ply. Some benefit outlay increases would result from the
return to the easier qualifying requirements and to the pay
ment of benefits, after a 13-week suspension, to UI
claimants disqualified for voluntary quits or misconduct
discharges. These increases, however, would be swamped by
27
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substantial outlay reductions caused by the deep cut in the
weekly benefit ceiling to earlier levels. Recent MESC
estimates (June 1982) indicate that the reduced ceiling alone
could lower projected outlays by more than $1.5 billion dur
ing the 1983-85 period. The debt would rise much less than
projected with all other current provisions continuing un
changed. This particular approach to dealing with the prob
lem, however, is so Draconian in its negative effects on the
benefits of unemployed workers that it is unlikely to be ac
ceptable. Rather, the possibility of those effects may help to
provide a strong incentive to take some action before the
sunset date.
At the other extreme, the state can decide to take whatever
action necessary to liquidate the debt completely and rebuild
the fund to a sound level in as short a period as possible.
Very heavy tax increases and severe benefit restrictions
would have to be concentrated in the next few years, which
are not expected to be properous economic times. This alter
native also appears unlikely to attract much support because
of its drastic immediate effects on both employers and
workers. Some approach between these two extremes seems
a more reasonable probability.
In designing a set of changes to move the UI fund toward
solvency, some goal setting is useful. One could, for exam
ple, specify that the debt be repaid in full by a certain date
and that the fund accumulate an adequate reserve in a given
period of time thereafter. To be sure, how specific that goal
can be and how closely pursued depend on how reliable the
projected outlook is for the years ahead. As noted before,
available projections are not certain and are likely to change.
Yet, they furnish a basis for setting a tentative goal to guide
planning for policy and program changes. The need for flex
ibility and for subsequent reconsiderations should be ap
preciated.
It is possible to indicate various goals that could be con
sidered to help determine changes to make in Michigan's UI
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law. Several are described below in ascending order of the
total effort required to achieve them, as measured by in
creased tax revenues and reduced benefit outlays. Projected
debt repayment through FUTA tax increases are taken into
account by the estimates cited.
1. Minimize or avoid the FUTA solvency tax that could
apply for 1985.
Any solvency rate added to the FUTA tax for 1985 is
to be calculated as the amount by which the annual
average of benefit costs of the prior five years, taken as
a percent of estimated taxable payrolls in 1985, exceeds
the average state UI tax rate estimated for 1985, also
based on taxable payrolls. The solvency rate for that
year cannot exceed 1.5 percent. Together with the penal
ty rate of 1.2 percent scheduled to apply for 1985, the
total increase could be the maximum addition of 2.7 to
the basic net FUTA rate of 0.7, thereby eliminating en
tirely the normal tax credit allowed against the federal
tax. Based on projections under current UI provisions,
the solvency rate would be set at the 1.5 level for 1985.
State tax revenues for that year would have to be over
$250 million more than projected to reduce the rate
below 1.5 and in excess of $500 million more to avoid
any solvency tax. The 1.5 percent FUTA solvency tax
rate that year would add an estimated $270 million to
the federal tax. Working up to the required state
revenue effort in 1985 over the 1983-1985 period, even
with some help from benefit reductions in 1983 and
1984 to lower the five-year average cost rate somewhat,
is probably the least demanding goal to pursue. Achiev
ing it would not, by itself, do much to lower the debt or
stem its increase, given the current outlook. The FUTA
penalty tax rate would continue to rise 0.3 each year for
some years thereafter. 23
2. Minimize or avoid the need for more borrowing.
Since interest is payable on any new debt incurred
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since April 1, 1982, it is clearly desirable to avoid, as
much as possible, further borrowing. To keep the
interest-bearing portion of the debt from rising beyond
the level currently projected at the end of 1982, it would
take a combination of revenue increases and outlay
reductions estimated at about $650 million a year for the
1983-1985 period.
3. Cap the penalty rate increase in the PUTA tax at 0.9 for
1985.
The conditions required to qualify for a cap on the
penalty rate were described in chapter 3. The two key re
quirements are a specified lowered debt level by the end
of the fiscal year and a specified revenue rate level in the
tax year for which the cap is sought. Based on the
MESC projections of June 1982, the debt at the close of
1985 is estimated at $3.8 billion; it may be somewhat
less at September 30, the end of the fiscal year. Without
any changes in current provisions, the debt would stand
about $2 billion higher than the level of three years
earlier, failing one of the key capping requirements. The
average tax or revenue rate for 1985 would fall far short
of the prior average annual five-year benefit cost ratio,
failing the other test. The increases in revenues and
reductions in outlays necessary to close these gaps
would have to exceed those changes necessary to avoid
further borrowing after 1982.
4. Reduce the outstanding debt to that portion not subject
to interest.
Debt incurred before April 1, 1982 does not bear in
terest. In addition to the effort needed to avoid further
borrowing during the 1983-1985 period, about another
$650 million in more revenues and benefit savings would
be needed over these years to bring the debt down to the
interest-free level. 24
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5. Cap the penalty rate increase in the FUTA tax at 0.6 for
1984.
The efforts required to meet the tests for this goal in
1984 appear to be beyond any reasonable expectations
at this time. All of the needed revenue increases and
outlay reductions would have to concentrate in the next
two years. They would have to total about $2 billion to
lower the debt to the approximately $1 billion level of
September 30, 1981, as required for the 1984 cap. State
tax revenues in 1984 alone would have to rise to about
$1.5 billion, compared with the level projected for that
year of about $850 million under current provisions.
These goals and the possibilities for achieving them have
been outlined only through 1985. Even with substantial ef
fort, it may not be plausible, given the present outlook, to
plan for much more than slowing down the increase in the
debt and interest costs. If the state's economy improves more
rapidly than now anticipated, that would help matters con
siderably by reducing benefit outlays and increasing revenues
even without taking account of program changes, and the
economy could sustain a stronger effort to speed repayment.
Beyond 1985, the outlook is too uncertain and projections
too unreliable to set changes in the law now that should be
expected to stand without further review.
There are many possible changes in state UI provisions
that can be considered to develop more revenues and to
reduce outlays. The more significant examples are described
next along with some estimates of their impact.

Increasing Revenues
States are fairly free to adopt whatever UI financing ar
rangements they choose in order to supply the necessary
revenues. The only restriction imposed by the federal law is
that employer state tax rates may not drop below 2.7 percent
of taxable wages except on the basis of experience rating, on
penalty of losing the full credit allowed against the federal
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tax. States can suspend experience rating and apply a
uniform rate, provided it is at least 2.7 percent. 25 Several
states follow this route when their reserve funds reach a low
point or go into debt. 26 Because of its chronically high
benefit cost levels and need to borrow in the past, Alaska
added an employee tax some years ago which varies between
0.5 and 1.0 percent of taxable wages ($14,600 as of 1982)
depending on the level of the fund. Alabama and New Jersey
also have an employee tax (0.5 percent in each state);
Alabama applies it only when the fund declines below a
specified level, as is now the case. Other approaches to in
crease revenues include a higher taxable wage base, a higher
tax rate schedule for given levels of cost experience, the addi
tion of a special surtax when the state fund is low or insol
vent, a higher minimum tax rate, and a higher maximum
rate.
Suspension of experience rating or the imposition of a
high minimum rate are not generally acceptable alternatives
for Michigan since experience rating appears to be so well
supported in the state. The inclusion of the uniform NEC
rate of 1.0 percent in the state tax reform adopted in 1977
was in part the result of a federal requirement the state had
to meet to qualify for a deferral of debt repayment coming
due at the time. In general, the coming progressive increases
in the uniform FUTA tax rate are looked upon as an
undesirable weakening of the experience-rating element in
UI financing. That effect has been countered to some extent
by the provision that credits half the FUTA rate increases
against the uniform state NEC tax rate. The problem is that
the credit slows down debt reduction. An employer group
that studied the UI financing problem in early 1982 reaffirm
ed experience rating as the basic concept for the UI tax struc
ture. 27

Increases in the Taxable Wage Base
Michigan's taxable wage base of $6,000 has been in effect
since 1978, rising then from $5,400. The federal base also
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went to $6,000 that year, from $4,200. States at least match
the federal wage base but many set higher levels. As of July
1982, 26 jurisdictions taxed more than the first $6,000. In 6
states, the base exceeded $10,000; in 11 states, it ranged from
$8,000 to $10,000. 28 In 13 states, the base is adjusted annual
ly to maintain a constant relationship to the state average an
nual wage; among these states, the proportions range be
tween about 54 and 100 percent. 29
The problem with a fixed dollar wage base is that as wage
levels rise over the years, the proportion of payrolls subject
to the tax diminishes. A relatively narrow base tends to
restrict the scope for experience rating. Short of taxing total
wages, nominal minimum and maximum tax rates translate
into different effective rates among employers on the basis
of total wages paid, depending on the proportions of their
total payrolls that are taxable. The latter, in turn, vary by the
level of wages paid as well as the amount of labor turnover.
Apart from Alaska, Michigan has averaged a higher wage
level than any other state. As a result, it taxes the lowest pro
portion of payrolls—only an estimated 34 percent in 1981; it
taxed about 41 percent in 1978 when the present base was
established. (For the United States as a whole in 1978, the
proportion was about 50 percent.) Michigan has not taxed as
much as half its payrolls since 1967. The growing restrictiveness of its tax base is part of the reason for its UI finan
cial problem, especially as the weekly benefit levels provided
have increased and extended benefits have stretched the
duration of weekly payments.
Raising the taxable wage base in Michigan is estimated to
increase revenues by between $100 million and $125 million a
year for each increase of $1,000 in the base, up to about the
$9,000 level. At $9,000, the base would equal about half the
state's average annual wage level in 1981. Without compen
sating adjustments in the tax rate structure, most employers
would pay more taxes in the first years of the increase. In
time, the rates would tend gradually to adjust downward,
assuming no increase in the level of benefit charges. Those
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employers with negative account balances who are already at
the maximum tax rate, or at a rate kept under the maximum
by the limit on annual rate increases, would continue to pay
more taxes. So would employers at the minimum rate of 1.0
percent.
High-wage paying employers who have also experienced
high benefit charges, such as many of those in construction
and in durable goods manufacturing, would have to take on
a heavier tax burden with a higher wage base, as compared
with other employers. That result would satisfy the
experience-rating objective more effectively. To ease the im
pact, a wage base increase could be accomplished gradually
over a period of years, such as raising the base by $1,000 or
$1,500 per year for each of the next several years. That ap
proach, of course, would slow down the revenue increases
needed urgently at this time. The best time to raise the wage
base is when employment and payrolls are expanding well
and the fund is in fairly good condition so that compensating
tax rate adjustments could occur more quickly. If and when
Michigan reaches that stage, a base pegged to a set propor
tion of the annual average wage would warrant serious con
sideration.

Other Changes in Employer Taxes
The only other change in the present tax structure
estimated to have a revenue effect almost as large as a $1,000
increase in the taxable wage base is an increase in the
uniform NEC rate from 1.0 to 1.5 percent. A milder or more
gradual alternative would be to eliminate the credit allowed
against the NBC rate for the coming FUTA increases for
debt repayment. Such an increase in the uniform compo
nent, however, runs contrary to the experience-rating objec
tive. In 1982, 20 states have a minimum tax rate higher than
1.0 percent, and about two-thirds of these states have taxable
wage bases above $6,000. 30
Two other changes that could be considered would tend to
strengthen the experience-rating effect of the tax: the
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elimination of the 0.5 limit on annual tax rate increases for
employers with combined CBC and ABC rates at or above 4
percent; and an increase in the ABC tax rates of individual
employers with inadequate reserves by raising the multiple
used in calculating the rate from 0.25 to 0.50 (see footnote
9). These two changes, together, were estimated to increase
revenues by about $115 million to $125 million a year at the
$6,000 taxable wage base, and by more at higher wage bases.
Eliminating the "limiter" entirely could produce a severe im
pact for some employers. A more moderate alternative
would be to raise the limit from 0.5 to, say, 1.0.
Other types of changes do not seem to offer much in the
way of added revenues. These include raising the maximum
tax rate by a percentage point or two, and increasing the
standard rate for new employers. The former would raise the
maximum rate to a double-digit figure, while the latter
would make more difficult the effort to attract new business
to the state. At some point, a review of the total UI tax struc
ture for another possible overhaul would probably be in
order.

An Employee Tax
Michigan has never looked to workers to help finance UI
benefits. The state's policy on this score is strongly rooted in
the philosophy that unemployment compensation should be
a cost of doing business and the sole responsibility of
employers. This view heavily influenced the character of the
UI system adopted for the United States; experience rating is
a direct descendant of that philosophy. Exclusive employer
financing through an experience-rated tax structure is a
distinctly American phenomenon in unemployment in
surance. Much of the motivation for the adoption of an
employee tax by the nine states that had it originally was the
expectation that costs would exceed the resources available
from employer taxes then deemed feasible. As the UI pro
gram developed, costs were less than expected; seven of the
nine states dropped the employee tax or shifted it to the
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financing of public temporary nonwork-connected disability
insurance. Alabama retained it but only in periods when its
benefit reserves were low. New Jersey adopted an employeefinanced temporary disability insurance program but also
kept a portion of the employee tax for UI financing. Alaska,
the first state to experience serious financial difficulties in
UI, added an employee tax to strengthen its financing. No
other state has taken this approach.
Besides adding strength to UI financing, another argu
ment supporting an employee tax is that it would instill in
workers a stronger sense of responsibility for and interest in
a good, well-balanced program, as well as justify a more
direct claim to an earned right to benefits. Many workers
believe they already pay into the UI program, mistakenly
ascribing their UI coverage to their social security contribu
tions. Theoretically, a case is made that employer UI tax
costs are ultimately shifted to workers anyway, either
through restraints on wages or additions to consumer
prices. 31 Countering the view that an employee tax would
fortify labor's interest in balanced UI legislation and fair ad
ministration is the position held by some employers that such
a tax would strengthen labor's demand for a more liberal
program. Employers, generally, have not favored employee
UI financing. Worker resistance to an employee tax reflects
general resistance to any tax increases and the view that
employers are entirely responsible for involuntary
unemployment. Many economists also hold a negative view
of an employee payroll tax because it is regressive, especially
one levied on a relatively low wage base.
Consideration of an employee UI tax arises at this time in
Michigan because of the program's financial problems. The
burden of debt repayment and reestablishment of a solvent
fund appears to be an overwhelming one for employer fi
nancing to carry alone in the coming years. The Michigan
employer UI working group adopted as a guiding principle
that the burden should be shared between business and
labor. The labor contribution could take the form of benefit
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restraint or reductions. But it could also include direct
employee contributions to the fund, at least as a temporary
measure. It can be argued that workers still employed could
afford a modest tax charge more readily than unemployed
workers could afford benefit reductions, although both ap
proaches may be utilized.
Using MESC taxable payroll projections for the 1983-1985
period, estimates indicate that for each 0.1 percent of taxable
wages, employee taxes could raise about $17 to $18 million a
year at the current $6,000 base. For each $1,000 added to the
taxable wage base, up to the $9,000 level, the yield would rise
by about 10 to 15 percent.

Changes to Reduce Benefit Outlays
Given current eligibility and benefit provisions, and the
assumed unemployment rates, MESC projects annual
benefit outlays from the fund at between $1.4 and $1.6
billion during the 1983-1985 period. Despite gradual lower
ing of estimated unemployment levels over these years,
outlay levels would still be high, even increasing after 1983
because of annual increases in the indexed weekly benefit
ceiling.
Early in 1982, the Governor proposed to increase the
state's minimum qualifying requirement for regular benefits
from 18 to 20 weeks of base-period employment and to
restore a waiting week of noncompensable unemployment. 32
Federal provisions now prohibit the payment of federallyshared extended benefits to claimants with less than 20 weeks
of base-period employment, and also prohibit federal shar
ing of the cost for the first week of extended benefits paid
when no waiting week had been served for regular benefits. 33
The states are not required to adopt these rules for regular
benefits, but a few have moved in that direction. MESC pro
jections for the 1983-85 period estimate that the two propos
ed changes would reduce benefit outlays by about $90 to $95
million per year. Another possible change is to increase the
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minimum weekly earnings requirement from $67 (20 times
the minimum hourly wage) to $100 (30 times that wage); pro
jected benefit savings amount to about $20 million a year for
this change.
The new temporary weekly benefit amount (WBA) provi
sions adopted at the end of 1980 moved Michigan from being
one of the least liberal states in this regard to one of the more
liberal. In relation to average weekly wage levels, the state's
former benefit ceilings, which had been unchanged since
1975, were about the lowest in the country; the current ceil
ing, at 58 percent of the average wage, compares much more
favorably. While, as of mid-1982, there were 23 states which
provided indexed WBA ceilings at higher percentages of
their average weekly wage levels, only 2 states had higher
dollar ceilings than the $197 level then applicable in
Michigan and 6 more had higher ceilings for claimants with
dependents. 34 At levels below the maximum, the proportion
of the claimant's weekly wage compensated by the WBA
tends to be somewhat larger for some claimants than is the
case in most states, although that was even more the case
before the change. Michigan's unique formula sets the WBA
at 70 percent of the weekly wage net of taxes, which makes
the benefit generally about 50 to 60 percent of the gross wage
depending on the claimant's wage level and number of ex
emptions. Most states compensate about 50 to 55 percent of
the gross weekly wage. 35
To reduce benefit outlays, various adjustments to the
WBA provisions can be considered. One is to hold or freeze
the maximum where it is now. MESC projections indicate
cost savings over the 1983-1985 period rising from about $50
million to $185 million a year, given the assumed unemploy
ment rates and annual 7 percent increases in average wage
levels. Without a freeze, the WBA ceiling would rise each
year reaching about $241 by 1985. Other possible WBA
changes to reduce cost include dropping the benefit-wage in
dex percentage for the maximum from 58 percent to a lower
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figure, and reducing the 70 percent of weekly-after-tax-wage
rate for individual WBA determinations. These changes
would not save as much as the freeze on the dollar ceiling
unless the reductions were rather substantial.
Cost savings can also be realized by cutting back on the
duration of benefits allowed by the Michigan program. Con
sidering the worsened unemployment problem in the state,
especially the increase in long term unemployment, there
have been no serious suggestions advanced to reduce benefit
outlays in this manner. The state's regular duration provi
sion is about comparable with that of most states; about 20
states are more liberal in their provisions and only about half
a dozen states are distinctly less liberal. 36

Effects of UI Program
Changes on State Fund
It is assumed that no legislative action will take place in
1982 that will affect benefit outlays and revenues for that
year. The projected 1982 year-end debt level of $2.2 billion
(Table 4) is therefore taken as the starting point for the
state's UI fund in 1983. Time is running short, but failure to
take action that would be effective for 1983 would be a
serious mistake, a lost opportunity to begin the long difficult
climb back to solvency before matters grow much worse.
The problem will not be resolved by one round of legisla
tion. It will have to be dealt with over a period of many years
during which its character and surrounding circumstances
are likely to change. Any changes adopted in the months
ahead probably should be considered applicable for only the
next two or three years. Near the end of that time, the situa
tion should be reexamined and further action formulated, as
appropriate. Much will depend on how economic conditions
develop. Changes may also occur at the federal level that will
need to be taken into account.
The focus of discussion here, therefore, is on the near term
prospects—on changes that would affect the program and
41
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trust fund in the 1983-1985 period. Taking the goals de
scribed earlier that may be considered as reasonably possible
for this period, the objective of the discussion is to show how
they might be achieved based on the latest available
estimates.

Overall View of Illustrative Changes
Table 5 illustrates how one combination of changes may
affect fund transactions over the 1983-1985 period. The data
are based on estimates made, as of June 1982, by MESC.
These changes represent but one of several possible combina
tions. Their selection for this particular illustration does not
necessarily connote approval, although some taxable wage
base increase and some restriction on the maximum WBA
are probably unavoidable in any combination.
The changes used for the Table 5 illustration are listed
below along with the approximate estimates of their effects,
by year, on revenues and outlays as compared with estimates
projected under current provisions.
1. Increase the taxable wage base for state UI taxes from
$6,000 to:
a. $7,000 for 1983 - adds $116 million to revenues
b. $8,000 for 1984 - adds $247 million to revenues
c. $9,000 for 1985 - adds $331 million to revenues
The federal taxable wage base for FUTA taxes is assum
ed unchanged at $6,000. (The $6,000 base is estimated
to equal about 32 percent of the average annual wage in
1982 and about 27 percent in 1985; a $9,000 base in 1985
would equal about 39 percent of the projected average
annual wage that year.)
2. Increase the multiple used in the calculation of the ABC
rate from 0.25 to 0.50, effective beginning 1983.
Estimated additions to revenues:
1983 - $ 79 million
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1984 - 92 million
1985 - 101 million
The revenue additions estimated for this change take ac
count of the increased wage bases specified above. Cur
rently, the ABC rate rises slowly for most employers
with account balances below the required level because
of the lower multiple and because the rate is calculated
on the basis of total payrolls though applied to taxable
payrolls (see footnote 9 for formula).
3. Eliminate the limiter on annual increases in the state UI
tax rate, effective beginning 1983.
Estimated additions to revenues:
1983 - $58 million
1984 - 68 million
1985 - 74 million
The estimated revenue additions take account of the in
creased taxable wage bases specified for these years.
4. Institute an employee UI tax contribution at 0.5 percent
of taxable wages, beginning 1983.
Estimated additions to revenues:
1983 - $ 97 million
1984- 113 million
1985 - 124 million
5. Freeze the maximum weekly benefit amount payable at
its current level (1982) of $197 through 1985.
Estimated savings in benefit costs:
1983 - $ 52 million
1984 - 129 million
1985 - 183 million
By 1985, the $197 maximum will have declined to less
than half the previous year's average weekly wage, if the
assumed annual 7 percent wage increase projected from
1981 is realized.
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6. Increase the minimum number of weeks of work re
quired in the base period to qualify for benefits from 18
to 20, effective beginning 1983.
Estimated savings in benefit costs:
1983 - $35 million
1984 - 37 million
1985 - 38 million
7. Establish a noncompensable waiting week for the first
week of unemployment claimed, effective beginning
1983.
Estimated savings in benefit costs:
1983 - $56 million
1984 - 58 million
1985 - 56 million
Table 5 shows that if all these changes were adopted with
their effects on revenues and outlays as estimated, then the
debt level would be up somewhat, to $2.3 billion, at the end
of 1983. It would be down to $2.1 billion a year later, and
substantially lower, to $1.7 billion, by the end of 1985. The
total effort encompassed by all these changes over the three
years would equal over $2 billion. Employer state tax in
creases would account for slightly over half, the employee
tax for about one-sixth, and benefit cost for almost a third.
In addition, FUTA penalty taxes levied on employers over
the three years would total an estimated $312 million, of
which $108 million would be offset by credits allowed for the
penalty taxes to reduce state taxes paid by employers in 1984
and 1985.
To meet certain more limited goals, not all of these
changes would be required. More ambitious goals may re
quire all of them and perhaps other or even larger changes
than those illustrated. The types and mix of changes to be in
cluded in any package, and their timing, would be subjects
of controversy. In the end, it will be necessary to reach an ac
ceptable compromise, a passable balance between employers
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Table 5
Projections of Michigan Unemployment Insurance Fund
Transactions and Debt Under Selected Illustrative
_____Changes in Current Provisions 1983 -1985_____
Estimated3
_________Item projected____________(in millions)
Fund balance (negative)—December 31, 1982
1983: Benefit outlays under current provisions0
Cost savings from
freeze of maximum WBA
$ 52
increase in qualifying weeks
35
waiting week
__56
Employer state taxes under current
provisions
Added revenues from
$7,000 wage base
$116
increased ABC multiple
79
elimination of limiter
__58
FUTA penalty tax (0.3 percent of 1982
federal taxable wages)
Employee tax (0.5 percent of state
taxable wages)
Fund balance (negative)—December 31, 1983
1984: Benefit outlays under current provisions0
Cost savings from
freeze of maximum WBA
increase in qualifying weeks
waiting week
Employer state taxes under current
provisions01
Added revenues from
$8,000 wage base
increased ABC multiple
elimination of limiter
Credit on NBC for part of FUTA
penalty tax paid in 1983
FUTA penalty tax (0.6 percent of 1983
federal taxable wages)
Employee tax (0.5 percent of state
taxable wages)
Fund balance (negative)—December 31, 1984

($2,204)b
(1,427)

143
770

253
48
97
($2,320)
(1,507)

$129
37
__58

224
882

$247
92
__68

407
(34)
102
____113
($2.133)
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Table 5 (continued)
Estimated3
_________Item projected____________(in millions)
($2,133)

Fund balance (negative)—December 31, 1984
1985: Benefit outlays under current provisions0
Cost savings from
freeze of maximum WBA
increase in qualifying weeks
waiting week
Employer state taxes under current
provisions'1
Added revenues from
$9,000 wage base
increased ABC multiple
elimination of limiter
Credit on NEC for part of FUTA
penalty tax paid in 1984
FUTA penalty tax (0.9 percent of 1984
federal taxable wages)
Employee tax (0.5 percent of state
taxable wages)
Fund balance (negative)—December 31, 1985

(1,535)
$183
38
__56

277
946

$331
101
__74

506
(74)
162
____124
($1,727)

NOTE: Figures within parentheses represent negative fund balances or subtractions from
the fund.
a. Based on data supplied by Michigan Employment Security Commission, June 1982. (See
text for more description of changes.)
b. From Table 4.
c. Includes state share of extended benefit costs.
d. Before allowance of credit for FUTA penalty tax paid.
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and labor, between positive and negative account employers,
and even between workers with more and those with less
stable employment.

Avoiding a 1985 FUTA
Solvency Rate Increase
A key planning factor will be to agree on some goal
reachable during the period. Of the goals enumerated earlier,
the least burdensome is to minimize or altogether avoid the
solvency rate increase on the FUTA tax that will apply to
1985 payrolls beyond the penalty rate increase.
The penalty tax for that year is scheduled to rise to 1.2 per
cent of federal taxable wages. A maximum solvency tax of
1.5 percent could be added making the total of penalty and
solvency taxes due in January 1986 a projected $486 million.
That would amount to a tripling of the FUTA tax increase
paid the previous year and, of course, would apply uniform
ly to all employers. To avoid any solvency tax for 1985, the
average state tax rate for 1985 would have to equal the
average benefit cost rate based on outlays of the previous
five years. Without any changes in current UI provisions, the
projected averages show that 1985 state tax revenues would
be short of this requirement by about $500 million. 37
Changes to bring about the needed revenue increases could
be made to take effect in 1985. Earlier changes would not be
necessary if avoiding the solvency rate were the only goal to
be pursued. Based on projections for 1985 shown in Table 5,
the increases in employer state taxes that year resulting from
the $9,000 wage base, the higher ABC multiple, and the
elimination of the limiter would total slightly over $500
million. Because of the higher wage base, the credit allowed
for the FUTA penalty tax paid would be about $20 million
more bringing the net increase down to below $500 million.
A 0.5 percent employee tax in 1985 on the $9,000 base would
yield $124 million. It would even be possible, based on these
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projected figures, to reduce or eliminate about $100 million
of these changes through, for example, a smaller wage base
increase, a lower employee tax rate, or retention or an
enlargement of the limiter, and still meet the revenue require
ment to avoid a solvency tax increase for 1985.
It should be noted that lowered benefit outlays in 1985
would not contribute toward this particular goal since that
year does not enter into the five-year benefit cost averaging.
Benefit reductions in 1983 and 1984 would help to lower the
average cost rate somewhat.
If the solvency tax is avoided by raising $500 million in ad
ditional state taxes in 1985, with no other changes the pro
jected total outstanding debt at the close of that year would
equal about $3.3 billion. Although some interest costs would
be saved after 1985, they would continue to run very high. It
should be remembered that the proceeds of the FUTA penal
ty taxes all apply to reduce the noninterest-bearing portion
of the debt first. Apart from some interest savings, the main
advantage gained would be to raise the added revenues
through experience-rated taxes, as generally preferred,
rather than by a uniform rate. The FUTA penalty rates
would continue upward in later years. While the smaller
solvency rate additions could be avoided by similar action,
the advantage narrows. 38

Keeping the Debt from Growing
To avoid the need to borrow further funds after 1982
would be a substantial accomplishment. The projections
(Table 4) indicate that the debt will probably rise from $2.2
billion to more than $3.8 billion over the next three years if
current UI provisions remain unchanged. Table 5 illustrates
how this goal can be achieved, and even exceeded.
The changes indicated would not forestall the need to bor
row about an additional $160 million in 1983. While benefit
outlays would be cut to less than $1.3 billion that year, in-
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creased state tax revenues, including the employee tax,
would still fall short by this much. (The total debt outstand
ing at the end of 1983 would rise by less than this amount
because of the FUTA penalty tax payment applied to the
noninterest-bearing portion of the debt.) That result could
be avoided, for example, by raising the taxable wage base to
more than $7,000 for that year, or by a larger employee tax
rate, or some combination of the two; or by some additional
benefit cuts. Assuming that only the changes shown in Table
5 are adopted, then no additional loans would be required in
1984 and, indeed, a surplus generated from operations that
year would permit repayment of about half the amount bor
rowed in 1983. With the 1984 FUTA penalty tax payments,
the total debt would be down to below $2.2 billion by the end
of the year. The projected operating surplus grows to nearly
$250 million in 1985 with the illustrated changes, allowing a
substantial debt reduction that year. If a smaller effort is
preferred in 1985, changes producing higher revenues could
be eased, such as holding the taxable wage base at the 1984
level of $8,000, or reducing the employee tax rate. The freeze
on the maximum WBA could be relaxed to allow for some
benefit increase, or some other restriction on benefits or
eligibility could be eased to reduce the effort. If the goal is
confined to keeping new debt from rising above the 1982
year-end level, then there would be room for a lessened
burden in 1985.
On the other hand, to confine the 1985 effort to satisfying
only that goal could lose the opportunity to avoid a solvency
tax increase for 1985. The changes shown on Table 5 would
accomplish that goal as well. Indeed, taking account of the
estimated state revenue increases illustrated for 1985, pro
jected state revenues for that year would exceed by about
$160 million the level required to avoid a solvency tax in
crease, as determined by the average annual benefit cost pro
jected for the 1980-1984 period. Holding on to all of the
changes shown for 1985 would reduce the interest-bearing
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portion of the debt to about three-fourths of what it would
be if the effort were limited to keeping that portion down to
the 1982 level. 39
Another consideration to bear in mind is that the state's
economy might be improved enough in 1985 to make it easier
to handle the heavier burden. If so, that would be the more
favorable time to step up rather than reduce the effort. That
judgment, however, can be made more appropriately in the
latter half of 1984.

Other Goals
A third goal listed earlier is to cap the FUTA penalty tax at
0.9 percent for 1985. Given the scenario illustrated in Table
5, it appears that projected revenues for 1985 would fall
short of the required level to qualify for the cap by about
$160 million. 40 A larger taxable wage base increase, or higher
employer or employee tax rates, could produce the addi
tional amount needed. 41 Whether to make the extra effort is
a decision that may be determined on a more solid basis in
1984.
Another goal discussed earlier is to liquidate the interestbearing debt as soon as possible so as to reduce and eliminate
interest costs. As of the end of 1982, about $640 million of
the projected debt of $2.2 billion is estimated to be interest
bearing. The changes illustrated on Table 5 result in a pro
jected debt level by the end of 1985 down to a little over $1.7
billion. About $475 million would remain subject to interest.
To raise this much more in added revenues and benefit cost
savings during the same period would require more severe
changes than illustrated. One would need to consider such
possibilities as higher tax bases, higher tax rates for
employers and employees, and further cutbacks in benefit
amount levels beyond holding the maximum frozen. It will
be difficult enough to achieve the illustrated changes, let
alone larger changes or others in addition.
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As pointed out earlier, a cap on the FUTA penalty tax in
crease for 1984 at 0.6 appears to be out of reach. State tax
revenues in 1984, with the changes illustrated, would be
about $80 million short of the specified requirement. More
difficult, however, is that in addition to the changes pro
jected in Table 5 for 1983 and 1984, about another $1 billion
would be needed to reduce the debt to the required level.
Summing up, then, it appears that efforts to avoid a
solvency rate in 1985 and to keep the debt from rising above
the level expected at the end of 1982 are within reasonable
bounds, though not to be considered easy to achieve. If
economic conditions improve as hoped, it may be possible to
go further. Even capping the penalty rate at 0.9 percent for
1985 might become a plausible outcome if all goes well. In
any case, about mid-1984 may be the right time to review the
problem again in the light of conditions at that time.
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Over the years, the tendencies in Congress have been to
tighten federal UI loan and repayment provisions. As more
states have borrowed increasing amounts from the loan
fund, concern has grown over a lack of financial discipline at
the state level. The imposition of interest on loans made after
March 1982 is the latest in a series of moves to make borrow
ing less attractive to the states. The objective is to encourage
stronger state efforts to assure financial solvency for their UI
funds.
At the same time, however, the problem remains that the
timing, frequency, and severity of cyclical economic
downturns are not easily or accurately predictable. Ex
perience since 1970 has included four recessions with varying
effects on the states. Over half of the states have had to bor
row at some time during this period. That unexpected ex
perience followed nearly a decade of almost continuous
prosperity and growth, also unexpected. While a lack of
responsible UI financing has contributed to the insolvency
problems of a number of states, it is the unpredictable and
uneven impact of recessions on individual states that causes
the basic difficulty in planning for financially solvent pro
grams. Michigan has been a prime example of this problem.
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Proposals for Short Term Relief
The debt problem in Michigan and other states has led,
from time to time, to suggestions for some relaxation of the
federal repayment provisions. Appeals for outright
forgiveness of part or all of a state's indebtedness are not
taken seriously since that step would amount to
discriminatory treatment. It would be unfair to states which
borrowed little or none at all, or repaid their loans quickly,
through strong efforts to remain solvent or to restore solven
cy.
Proposals to delay repayment or stretch it out over a
longer period have brought some response in the past.
Because of the severity of the recession of the mid-1970s,
states which borrowed were allowed an extra three years
before beginning debt repayment, although they had to meet
certain minimum requirements in regard to their tax provi
sions to qualify for the extension. By the time this extension
ended, another recession had developed posing further
financial difficulties for some of the borrowing states.
Rather than begin the repayment process then through the
FUTA progressive tax increases, Michigan chose to repay its
entire debt at the close of 1979, since it had accumulated the
funds to do so, and to obtain new loans very soon thereafter.
Repayment of the new debt through FUTA tax increases will
not begin until January 1983, three years after the new bor
rowing began.
The current recession generally has been about as serious
as that of the mid-1970s, and even worse in some states.
Congress, however, has not been inclined to delay the repay
ment process again. Instead, through the amendments
adopted in 1981, states were offered the option of leveling
out the FUTA penalty tax rate increases by capping the rate,
during a period of several years, if they exerted greater ef
forts toward regaining solvency. Michigan leaders and Con-
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gressional delegates have recently pressed for some
postponement of federal tax rate increases and suspension of
interest charges for states that experience very high rates of
insured unemployment and maintain above-average tax ef
forts. Another proposal advanced by Michigan represen
tatives is to allow states to make the repayments called for by
the FUTA tax increases from state UI tax funds instead so as
to apply experience rating to these past costs. That approach
would also relieve the problem of the FUTA increases on
new employers. 42
Congressional reluctance to ease debt repayment provi
sions may reflect the attitude that the states have not done
enough to improve the solvency prospects for their pro
grams. Not very many states have been in so serious a
predicament as Michigan, thus limiting the number of states
pressing for relief. Moreover, since UI trust fund transac
tions are included in the consolidated federal budget, there
may be a fair amount of resistance at the federal level to
changes that reduce or delay inflows of funds from loan
repayments amid efforts to cut down federal budget deficits.
The estimated totals of UI loan repayments and interest rise
from about $900 million in fiscal year 1982 to about $2.5
billion in fiscal 1985. 43

Long Term Remedies for Insolvency
Federal budget concerns may partly explain the total
neglect of certain recommendations of the National Com
mission on Unemployment Compensation, made in 1980,
which would help ease some of the UI financial problems in
the states. 44 These recommendations view a portion of the UI
benefit costs for long term unemployment of the national
recession of the mid-1970s as an appropriate burden of
general revenues of the federal government rather than of UI
tax funds. Under one proposal, federal general revenues
would reimburse the states for the state share of any extend-
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ed benefits they paid in 1975 through 1978 when the national
trigger was on. 45 A total of $3.3 billion would be restored to
state funds to be used for current benefit needs or debt
repayment. The other recommendations call for retroactive
general revenue financing of the federal share of extended
benefits paid during the same period and of federal sup
plemental benefits paid in the earlier part of that period,
which had been financed by FUTA tax revenues. 46 A total of
over $9 billion is involved for these federal benefit costs. The
present basic net FUTA tax rate of 0.7 percent includes 0.2
percent to cover most of these costs which were financed at
the time by advances from the U.S. Treasury. In effect,
those advances would be cancelled and the FUTA tax rate
could thereby be reduced. Besides the federal budget con
cerns noted above, opposition to any general revenue financ
ing of UI benefits discourages serious consideration of these
recommendations.
A more fundamental remedy for the insolvency problem is
that of reinsurance or cost equalization. These approaches
have been considered and debated over the years, especially
when states encountered financial difficulties. Interest and
support probably reached their highest levels in the late
1970s when so many states were insolvent. While insolvency
remains and has again grown more widespread, interest in
and support for reinsurance have receded. The subject is
complex, controversial, and politically divisive. 47
The cost equalization or reinsurance concept provides for
a second line of protection against extremely high or
catastrophic costs that may be beyond the means or
resources of individual insurers. Reinsurance against such
costs is broadly pooled among all insurers. In UI terms, ex
treme or "catastrophic" benefit costs are defined as those
associated with very high levels of unemployment in a
state. 48 A national reinsurance or cost-equalization fund,
established from a uniform tax applicable in all states, would
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finance a portion of those costs. With such a scheme in ef
fect, the worst UI cost extremes of recessions experienced by
some states would be eased. State planning for the financial
solvency of their UI funds would be easier and more reliable.
A major supporting argument for reinsurance is that na
tional recessions arise from developments and carry effects
that are not confined within states lines. The recessions that
Michigan and some other states have been experiencing have
reached extremes because of national and international fac
tors for which, it is argued, the employers of those states
cannot be held solely responsible when it comes to UI costs.
Opponents argue that even these high costs are not beyond
the means of the individual states and that pooling con
travenes the cost allocation objective of experience rating.
Most states, moreover, believe they would never benefit, or
benefit very little from reinsurance or cost equalization
depending on how the key elements are defined.
Various reinsurance and cost equalization plans have been
advanced in past years. The National Commission on
Unemployment Compensation conducted a thorough review
of the different ideas it received and recommended a modest
version of one. 49 Based on past experience, Michigan would
stand to benefit more than most states from almost any
reasonable plan.
Another approach to easing the state burdens of extreme
recession benefit costs is to pool nationally more of the costs
of long term benefits, carrying further the degree of sharing
now applicable in the case of triggered extended benefits.
One version of this idea is contained in a suggested restruc
turing of the UI system developed elsewhere by this author. 50
In that plan, benefits paid to compensate for increasingly
long term unemployment would be increasingly pooled on a
national basis. States would finance all the costs of the first
13 weeks of benefits, share equally with the federal govern
ment the costs of the next 13 weeks, and pay none of the
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costs of the 27th through the 39th weeks of benefits which
would be entirely financed by the federal unemployment tax.
Since the duration of unemployment lengthens in recessions,
the states that are hit the hardest would benefit the most
from increased federal financing of long term benefits. The
underlying rationale is that unemployment which continues
beyond the usual limits of a short term, temporary layoff is
more likely to have characteristics of a permanent job
dislocation in a labor market adversely affected by external
conditions. The remedy for the individual's problem may re
quire close job search assistance, job development, voca
tional guidance, retraining and other adjustments. Long
term unemployment—its character, treatment, and costs, in
cluding UI—appears increasingly removed from the con
cepts of experience-rated employer financing and individual
state responsibility. 51

Summary and
Concluding Observations
Summary
At mid-1982, the Michigan unemployment insurance trust
fund owed a total of $1.6 billion to the federal loan fund.
Further borrowing will probably raise the debt to about $2.2
billion by the year's end. Loans made before April 1982 bear
no interest, but subsequent loans do. Even with some
modest, gradual decline in the state's high unemployment
levels, without changes in its present UI provisions, the tax
structure will not raise sufficient revenues to come close to
covering the benefit outlays projected over the next several
years. The debt, therefore, can be expected to grow. As
estimated in June 1982, it could reach $2.8 billion by the end
of 1983 and rise by another half billion in each of the next
two years. The interest liability alone would come to several
hundred million dollars in this period and would have to be
paid from funds outside the UI program.
Beginning with the tax applicable to 1982 taxable payrolls
and payable in the following January, the uniform federal
tax rate levied under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act
(FUTA) will rise for all Michigan employers by 0.3 of a
percentage point each year, progressively. These "penalty"
59
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rate increases go towards reducing the debt. The increase will
be 1.2 percent for 1985, to which could be added a "solven
cy" rate of as much as another 1.5 percent. Payable January
1986, this combined maximum PUTA increase of 2.7 percent
for 1985 is projected at about $500 million, assuming the
present federal taxable wage base of $6,000. Penalty taxes
for the three previous years are estimated to total about $300
million. 52 Even with these repayments, the interest liabilities
remain undiminished since the FUTA tax increases apply to
reduce the noninterest-bearing portion of the debt first.
Michigan employers generally, and especially those who
have generated little or no UI costs, object to the FUTA tax
approach to debt repayment because it assesses the burden
uniformly among all employers, contrary to the preferred
approach of experience rating. The state's UI tax rates vary
among individual employers between a minimum of 1 and a
maximum of 9 percent of taxable wages on the basis of their
benefit cost experience. At mid-1981, nearly half of all rated
employers had negative account balances—past taxes they
had paid in were exceeded by the benefits charged to them.
Positive account employers feel that since they are not
responsible for the debt, they should not be burdened with
its repayment. They prefer to see state taxes increase in ways
that will draw more heavily from negative account
employers, such as firms in construction and auto manufac
turing. In turn, the latter argue that their businesses are too
depressed to take heavy tax increases at this time.
To help overcome the insolvency problem, discussions
have centered on changes in state UI provisions designed to
increase revenues and reduce benefit outlays. The immediate
objectives are to stem the borrowing and, possibly, begin to
cut the debt during the next few years. Because of the prob
lem's severity and the current economic distress, efforts by
both employers and workers are emphasized in working
toward these goals. On the revenue side, the most prominent
changes include increases in the state's taxable wage base,
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larger annual increases in tax rates by easing restrictions that
now limit such increases, and a temporary employee tax.
Changes examined on the benefit side that would restrict
outlays include holding the weekly benefit maximum at its
current $197 level instead of allowing it to index upwards,
establishing a noncompensable waiting week, and increasing
from 18 to 20 the minimum number of weeks of work re
quired to qualify for benefits.
Using estimates provided by the Michigan Employment
Security Commission (MESC), based on projections that
agency made in June 1982, several changes were selected to
illustrate how they might affect revenues, outlays, and the
debt over the 1983-1985 period (see Table 5). The changes in
clude raising the tax base from its present $6,000 level by
$1,000 each year to $9,000 in 1985, eliminating the limit of
0.5 of a percentage point on annual tax rate increases, alter
ing the formula to allow for a larger annual increase in the
account building component of the tax for employers with
inadequate account balances, and setting an employee tax at
0.5 percent of taxable wages. They also include the three
changes noted above on the benefit side. The combined in
crease in revenues and reduction in outlays projected over
the three years are substantial, totaling over $2 billion. These
changes, together with estimated FUTA penalty tax
payments in these years, would keep the debt from rising
much above the $2.2 billion level after the early part of 1983,
and make possible some reduction in 1984 and a sizable
reduction in 1985 to about $1.7 billion by the end of that
year. Interest costs would be considerably lower as a result.
The changes would also enable the state to avoid a solvency
rate addition on the FUTA tax for 1985.
As emphasized more than once in the course of this paper,
the projections of UI fund transactions and debt for the next
several years represent estimates based on various assump
tions about economic conditions and related experience pat
terns which may not, and probably will not endure. That is
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especially so in times of uncertainty, stress, and change as
characterize the current period. It would be prudent,
therefore, to expect that events and new experience will re
quire altered projections from time to time, perhaps con
siderably altered in some respects. The main value of looking
ahead, even somewhat speculatively, is to obtain some idea
of the general dimensions of the insolvency problem and
what potential remedies might contribute to its control and
reduction. Projections beyond 1985 are not used since the
further out in time they go, the more tenuous they become.
Program changes probably are best planned for the next two
or three years only, with a fresh review before proceeding
further.
The projected effects of the UI changes selected to il
lustrate what could be accomplished over the 1983-1985
period show heavy burdens and sacrifices on the part of
employers and workers (Table 6). Of the total of $2.1 billion
in added state revenues and reduced outlays in these years,
employer tax increases resulting from the changes account
for about 54 percent, the employee tax about 16 percent, and
the benefit reductions about 30 percent. Adding the FUTA
penalty taxes payable in these three years (about $300
million) raises the total effort to over $2.4 billion and the
employers' share to 58 percent The combined effects grow
larger each year with less than 25 percent of the 3-year total
coming in the first year and over 40 percent in the third. The
hope is that the increasing size of the changes will be match
ed by improvements in the economy, making them
somewhat easier to sustain. It has been noted that the higher
state tax revenues produced by the changes in 1985 would
preclude any solvency addition to the FUTA tax for that
year. In effect, that result would offset over half the pro
jected 1985 increase in employer state taxes substituting an
experience-rated for a uniform tax.
As summarized in Table 7, the projections show that the
state average UI tax rate of Michigan employers will prob-
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ably hover around 1.3 percent of total payrolls between 1982
and 1985 with no changes in current tax provisions. Adding
the basic PUTA taxes and penalty rates for these years, and
the solvency rate increase for 1985, the combined average
rate rises from 1.6 percent in 1982 to 1.8 percent in 1984 and
then jumps to 2.3 percent in 1985. With the tax changes
noted and illustrated in Table 5, the average state tax rate in
creases to 2.1 percent by 1985 while the combined statefederal rate rises to 2.6 percent by that year.
Table 6
Summary of Estimated State Revenue Increases
and Outlay Reductions Resulting from
Illustrative UI Changes, Michigan
1983-1985

Type of change

(Estimate of change in millions)
Total
1985
1983
1983-1985
1984

Increased revenues:
Employer taxes
Employee taxes
Reduced benefit outlays

$253
97
143

$400a
113
224

$486a
124
277

$1,139
334
644

$493

$737

$887

$2,117

Total

SOURCE: Table 5.
a. Net of additional credit allowed against state tax, due to increased state taxable wage
base, for half the FUTA penalty tax rate.

Even given continued slow but steady improvement in the
state's economy and a gradual decline in unemployment,
many years of strong effort may be needed to repay the debt
completely and rebuild the fund to adequate reserve levels.
Any recurrence of a cyclical downturn would probably
reverse at least some of the gains made and require renewed
borrowing. Not to expect one or more recessions over the
next 8 to 10 years, however, would seem to be unrealistic.
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Table 7
Projected UI Taxes and Average Tax Rates
Paid by Michigan Employers Under Current (1982) Law
and With Illustrative Changes
1982 -1985
(Dollar figures in millions)
1983 1984 1985

1982
Under current (1982) law
State UI taxes
Federal (FUTA) UI taxesb
Average UI tax rate (as percent
of total payrolls):
- State
- Combined state-federal
With illustrative changes (1983-1985)d
State UI taxes
Federal (FUTA) UI taxesb
Average UI tax rate (as percent
of total payrolls):
- State
- Combined state-federal

$644
160

$770
221

$855a $892a
612C
288

1.3%
1.6

1.3%
1.7

1.4%
1.8

$644
$160

$1,023 $l,255a $l,378a
342
288
221

1.3%
1.6

1.8%
2.2

2.0%
2.4

1.3%
2.3

2.1%
2.6

SOURCE: Based on projections prepared by the Michigan Employment Security Commis
sion in June 1982.
a. Net of FUTA penalty rate credits allowed against state tax in 1984 and 1985.
b. Includes basic net tax of 0.7 percent and penalty rate increases applicable for year and
payable in January of the following year.
c. Includes solvency rate addition applicable for 1985 and payable in January 1986.
d. See Table 5.

The changes described for the Michigan UI program and
the added burdens they entail for employers and workers
over the next few years are painful, perhaps more than they
can reasonably be expected to bear under current and an
ticipated conditions. Congress is being urged to provide
some relief from federal repayment and interest re-
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quirements during a period of economic distress for states in
such difficulty, mainly by allowing more time for recovery
first. Some effort to deal with the problem at the state level
may be necessary before a favorable federal response can be
expected. For the longer run, there remains the problem of
severe and uneven impact of regional, national and interna
tional dislocating factors on state economies. To hold
employers within a heavily impacted state fully liable for all
UI costs that may be traced to such external causes raises
some question about the proper balance between state and
national considerations. The remedies that have been ad
vanced and debated for this kind of problem include na
tional UI cost equalization or reinsurance schemes and
enlarged national pooling of long duration unemployment
benefit costs. Further consideration of the problem and of
such approaches is warranted.

Some Concluding Observations
At present, each state remains responsible for its own UI
benefit costs regardless of how severe unemployment
becomes or its cause. Only when extended benefits are
payable for long term joblessness during recession periods is
there some broader national sharing of part of these costs. 53
Given current experience and that of the past decade or so,
unemployment seems likely to remain a larger and more
costly problem than it was in the previous twenty years. In
dividual states, therefore, should probably plan to ac
cumulate larger benefit reserves than they had before to
assure fund solvency and to minimize the need to borrow,
particularly if their experience and industrial characteristics
make them vulnerable to recession extremes or prolonged
structural changes in their economies.
The predominant view of unemployment insurance fi
nancing in this country regards benefit costs primarily as
part of the cost of business operations allocable to the goods
and services produced, and, through the price mechanism,
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subject to the competitive discipline of the market system.
That view underlies the experience rating concept in UI
taxes. There are limits, however, to the application of this
concept. Within states, some pooling occurs of costs that are
not charged to individual employers, or which are not entire
ly recovered even if charged. These include benefits charged
to employers who terminate their business with no funds re
maining to cover their UI liabilities, or benefits not effective
ly charged to employers who always have negative account
balances because of chronically heavy seasonal layoffs. In
many states, including Michigan, the state share of extended
benefit costs is not charged to individual employers.
Where the limits are drawn on experience rating varies
considerably from state to state. For example, in only 2
states was it possible in 1982 for employers to qualify for a
zero tax rate, but in 11 others the minimum rate was 0.1 per
cent or less; the minimum exceeded 2.0 percent in 7 states. 54
Maximum tax rates varied in 1982 from 2.8 percent in Utah
to 10.0 percent in Kentucky. Even at the maximum rate,
there are always some employers whose taxes never cover
their benefit charges. A top limit is set to keep the tax from
becoming so prohibitive as to drive these firms out of
business or out of the state.
Michigan's high maximum tax rate of 9.0 percent appears
to confirm the state's strong commitment to the experiencerating principle. 55 On the other hand, its current taxable
wage base of $6,000 is so low, relative to wage levels general
ly, as to nullify much of that commitment. That is especially
so since so many high-cost employers are also high-wage
employers, or at least they account for a disproportionate
share of all payrolls. The 0.5 limit on annual tax rate in
creases in Michigan accentuates that effect. (Curiously, the
lowest state tax rate ceiling of 2.8 percent in Utah is not
much different from the maximum rate of 9.0 percent in
Michigan when both are converted to a total payrolls basis
since Utah's taxable wage base is set at 100 percent of the
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state's average annual wage while Michigan's base is about a
third of its average annual wage.)
Raising the taxable base in Michigan is probably the most
significant step that can be taken both to deal with the cur
rent debt and to assure the future solvency of the state fund.
Low-cost employers currently tend to favor this move, along
with ending the tax increase limiter and speeding the
rebuilding of individual employer account balances through
higher ABC rates, all designed to recover benefit costs as
charged. The alternative is to finance more of these costs
through the uniform state tax component (NEC) and FUTA
penalty rate increases. High-cost, high-wage employers, who
in most cases also support experience rating but who have
been seriously affected by the recession (particularly firms in
auto manufacturing, construction, and related industries)
oppose these changes at this time, or at least oppose the
adoption of all of them at once. Whatever the current solu
tion adopted, however, the long term need to raise the tax
able wage base to a much higher level and to maintain it in a
reasonable relationship to average wage trends must be ad
dressed eventually.
The undesirable disincentive effects of the FUTA penalty
tax increases with respect to new employers has been noted.
Since penalty tax proceeds apply to reduce the debt to which
new employers had not contributed, some means of offset
ting or relieving them of this tax charge would be ap
propriate. Until experience rating is fully operative for them,
new employers do not have an NEC rate against which to
allow the credit provided other employers for half the FUTA
penalty rate. It might be useful to consider a deferred credit
allowance against a new employer's NEC rate when the latter
applies even though the credit is taken after the normal time.
Perhaps a 100 percent credit could be allowed in such cases
instead of only half. Federal law may not permit this ap
proach, in which case an enabling amendment could be
sought to allow it, or in some other way relieve new
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employers of the penalty tax. The state is not required to
charge new employers the standard rate of 2.7 percent; it
could be lower. Several states do apply lower rates until ex
perience rating applies. 56 Michigan might want to consider
this approach. Another alternative would be to allow new
employers to take a credit against the state's Single Business
Tax for the FUTA penalty tax paid.
The various measures representing what workers may con
tribute toward reducing the debt are also difficult to con
template in the current economic climate. Labor has not paid
close attention in the past to UI financing, considering that
to be strictly an employer concern. As is evident, however,
inadequate financing can raise problems for the benefit side
of the program. A small temporary UI tax on employees,
perhaps one that would take effect when the fund is below a
specified solvency level, could help balance labor's interest in
the program on a long term basis while helping to overcome
the present insolvency.
Other changes considered above—the waiting week, a
higher qualifying requirement, and a freeze on the WBA
maximum—are bitter pills for labor to swallow. There has
been some tendency to blame much of the state's financial
difficulties in UI on allegedly overly generous benefit and
eligibility provisions. The current high dollar weekly max
imum is often cited as an example in comparisons with other
states. A few facts should be noted to place such claims in
perspective. As of July 1982, eight states paid weekly benefit
amounts higher than Michigan's current maximum of
$197. 57 More important is the relationship of benefits to
wage levels. Except for Alaska, Michigan's average wage
clearly exceeds that of all other states (Alaska's WBA ceiling
is $222 for claimants with three or more dependents).
Michigan's maximum WBA in relation to its average wage
level, set at 58 percent, is as high as or higher than the com
parable relationship in about half the states. While
Michigan's adoption of this level for the maximum in April
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1981 did increase benefit outlays sharply over what they
would have been otherwise, it must be remembered that the
former level was very low, unchanged since 1975. The
mistake was to have increased weekly benefits without pro
viding the needed additional financing for them at the same
time. In effect, the 1975 weekly maximum of $136 (less for
claimants with fewer than four dependents) was frozen at
that level for over five years while Michigan overcame its
earlier debt problem. Even without the increase in the ceiling
in April 1981, unemployment has been so high in the state
that the fund would have been deeply in debt in any case.
Almost $900 million of the current debt was incurred before
the new benefit provisions went into effect.
Michigan is 1 of only 11 states that have no waiting week,
although 7 additional states compensate that week retroac
tively after the unemployed worker has drawn benefits for at
least a specified number of weeks, ranging among these
states from 3 to 9 weeks. As for the qualifying requirement,
Michigan's minimum of 18 weeks of base-period employ
ment is about as high as or higher than that of nearly half the
states; 26 states require 20 or more weeks of work, or some
equivalent spread of earnings over the year. Michigan's
benefit duration provision is about average and its major dis
qualification provisions, like most states, now call for a
minimum amount of earnings (or work) after the dis
qualification to requalify for benefits. In general,
Michigan's eligibility and benefit provisions are not out of
line in comparison with other states. 58
To what extent labor may be willing to forego gains made,
even temporarily, may depend on how well employer financ
ing faces up to the insolvency problem. In the interest of job
security and employer continuity, workers recently have
shown some willingness to restrain wage and benefit
demands. Cooperation in resolving the present problem is
also important to a reasonable solution and to longer term
fund solvency as well.
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The possible changes in the state's UI program reviewed in
this paper have been examined for their estimated effects on
the fund for the next several years. Even if all changes were
to be adopted and the projections were to come fairly close
to actual experience, there would still remain a substantial
debt at the end of 1985 and the task of building an adequate
reserve beyond that. It will be necessary to return to dealing
with the problem and to consider further program changes
or extensions of earlier changes. Experience, moreover,
probably will not coincide with projections, and the problem
could take unforeseen turns. The long term outlook pro
mises more questions to resolve, more controversy, and the
need for continuing study and analysis.
In view of the sensitive nature of the problem, as well as its
long term aspects, it might well be worth considering the
establishment of a broadly representative, high-level group
of citizens of the state as an independent body to maintain a
continuing study of the UI insolvency problem and to pro
vide recommendations for treatment. Such an approach
should not be the occasion for any delay of the action needed
now for the next two or three years. The task would be to
review the situation and experience with the changes made in
place and to determine what might be done thereafter. The
group should be constituted so as to command the widest
respect and authority. Although it must reflect and take ac
count of the major economic interests that are concerned,
the group must keep foremost the overall interest of all the
people of Michigan. The problem of the state's debt and
continuing insolvency is too large and too serious to leave to
a desultory process for its eventual resolution.

Supplementary Note
New Federal Legislation
As this paper was being prepared for publication, Con
gress adopted a number of amendments to the provisions of
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) which have an
important bearing on Michigan's UI financing problems.
The FUTA amendments were included among a group of tax
changes designed to raise more federal revenues over the next
several years to help reduce the large budget deficits pro
jected over that period. The tax changes are contained in the
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (H.R.
4961) passed by the Congress August 19, 1982. This note
summarizes the relevant elements of the FUTA changes and
how they may alter the analyses presented in the paper.*

Increase in FUTA Tax Base and Rate
One of the amendments raises the taxable wage base for
the federal unemployment tax from $6,000 to $7,000, and in
creases the net basic FUTA tax rate from 0.7 to 0.8 percent
(the total rate increases from 3.4 to 3.5 percent less the 2.7
percent tax credit). Both increases become effective in calen
dar 1983.
The increase in the federal base requires the Michigan UI
taxable wage base also to rise to at least $7,000 in 1983. A
$7,000 base is one of the changes illustrated for Michigan
"This summary was prepared from excerpts of the report of the House-Senate Conference
Committee on the bill.
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that year in chapter 5 (see Table 5). The annual progressive
0.3 percent FUTA penalty rate increases will be the same,
but the projected amount of the tax increases they represent
is almost 15 percent more than that shown for the years af
fected because of the higher base. Thus, the projected total
of penalty tax payments due in 1984 and 1985, based on 1983
and 1984 payrolls, respectively, rises by about $36 million,
producing more debt reduction by 1985.
The increase in the net basic FUTA tax rate from 0.7 to 0.8
percent does not affect the Michigan UI fund. Its purpose,
along with that of the federal wage base increase, is to raise
FUTA tax revenues to finance more adequately the
program's administrative costs and the federal share of ex
tended benefit costs.

Elimination of the FUTA
Solvency Rate Addition
As part of the FUTA tax increase method of making UI
debt repayments, the provisions adopted in 1981 called for
adding a solvency rate to the penalty rate increase. In
Michigan's case, the solvency rate would be added each year,
beginning with the year when the penalty rate reaches 1.2
percent, and is based on a comparison of the prior five-year
average cost rate and the current year's average tax rate. The
addition would apply unless certain state revenue conditions
are met (see "Repayment Provisions" in chapter 3). Without
any change in current state UI provisions, Michigan
employers would face a solvency tax addition of 1.5 percent
for 1985, payable in 1986, resulting in the loss of the entire
FUTA tax credit of 2.7 percent. The FUTA solvency tax ad
dition for that year is projected to total about $270 million
on the $6,000 taxable wage base or $310 million on the
$7,000 base. It would require adoption of most of the state
UI tax changes illustrated for 1985 on Table 5 to avoid the
addition of the solvency tax.
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One of the FUTA amendments adopted in August 1982
eliminates the solvency rate addition based on comparisons
with average cost rates as part of the repayment process. The
FUTA penalty rate increase continues to apply and rise, pro
gressively, by 0.3 per year.
With the solvency rate addition out of the picture, the
state tax increases produced by the changes illustrated in
Table 5 for 1985 could be substantially reduced if the goal is
confined to keeping the debt from rising above the $2.2
billion level projected for the end of 1982. As noted earlier,
however, easing the effort would lose the opportunity for
significant reduction of the debt, particularly of the interestbearing portion. If the state's 1985 economy appears capable
of carrying the larger UI tax burdens called for by the
changes illustrated, that would be an opportune time to press
for debt reduction.

State Fund Repayment Option
for Penalty Tax
Under a new provision added by the August 1982 FUTA
amendments, a state may choose to pay from its own UI
funds, accumulated through increased tax revenues, an
amount equivalent to the FUTA penalty tax due, instead of
the amount being collected through the uniform FUTA tax.
In doing so, the debt repayment could be made through
funds raised as the state chooses, including increases in
experience-rated taxes, thereby overcoming a major objec
tion to the uniform FUTA tax approach. Repayment
through state UI funds would also solve the problem for the
new employer who would be subject to the FUTA penalty
tax increase.
The state, however, must meet certain other conditions in
order to choose this option. These include having enough ac
cumulated in the state UI fund to cover expected benefit

74

costs in the three months following the payment (from
November 1) without resorting to further loans in that
period, and the repayment of all loans made during the year
for which the penalty rate applies. The objective is to assure
that the state does not relax its effort to regain solvency by
shifting gains it is making to cover the payment of the penal
ty tax equivalent. These conditions probably will be very dif
ficult to meet for 1983 when a 0.6 percent FUTA penalty rate
applies, even if all state UI program changes illustrated in
Table 5 are adopted. The chances for the option would be
better in 1984 with those changes.

Deferred Interest Payment in Recession
Another FUTA amendment allows a state liable for in
terest on UI loans to defer 75 percent of the amount due for
a given fiscal year if its insured unemployment rate in the
January-June period of the preceding calendar year averaged
7.5 percent or more. One-third of the deferred interest would
become payable in each subsequent year in which the
specified insured unemployment rate requirement was not
met until the total amount deferred was paid. Additional in
terest accrues on the portion deferred.
Michigan's insured unemployment rate for the JanuaryJune 1982 period averaged above the 7.5 percent level. As a
result, only one-fourth of the interest payment due October
1983 for fiscal 1983, projected at about $84 million, need be
paid then—about $21 million—if the state chooses to defer.

Effects on Average State-Federal Tax Rates
Table 7 (in chapter 7) compares employer UI taxes and tax
rates projected under current law with those estimated after
allowing for the changes illustrated in Table 5. Among the
data reflecting the changes, the estimated amount of federal
taxes shown as paid in the 1983-1985 period would be over 20
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percent more because of the higher federal wage base and
rate. The combined average state-federal UI tax rate on a
total payrolls basis would still round to 2.2 percent in 1983
but rise slightly in 1984 and 1985, rounding to 2.5 and 2.7
percent, respectively.
The amount of federal UI taxes shown for 1985 in Table 7,
under current law, reflects the projected solvency tax ap
plicable for that year. Elimination of the solvency tax in
crease reduces the amount of federal taxes projected for that
year on the $6,000 base by $270 million. Adjusting further
for the effects of the higher FUTA base and rate, but with no
changes in current state tax provisions besides substituting a
$7,000 base, would probably result in a combined statefederal rate for 1985 of about 2.1 percent of total payrolls.
The equivalent averages would be about 2.0 percent for 1983
and 2.1 percent for 1984.

Other Changes
Congress also adopted some other modifications affecting
UI financing. One, not to take effect until 1985, would in
crease the gross FUTA tax rate from the present 3.4 percent
to 6.2 percent and the tax offset allowed from 2.7 to 5.4 per
cent. The net basic FUTA rate would remain at 0.8 percent,
including the temporary 0.2 now collected to repay U.S.
Treasury advances to the federal UI trust fund account to
cover the federal share of extended benefit costs and the
costs of federal supplemental benefits paid in 1976 and 1977
prior to their financing by general revenues. The principal ef
fect of this change would be to require all states to have a
maximum tax rate in their own laws of not less than 5.4 per
cent, as compared with 2.7 percent now. In 1982, only 21
states, including Michigan, had maximum tax rates at least
that high. The apparent objective is to increase the effec
tiveness of experience rating through a wider range of tax
rates. One result may also be to restrain tendencies to in-
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crease the taxable wage base and shift more of the burden to
lower wage paying employers.
Another change would increase the proportion of FUTA
taxes collected (other than penalty taxes for loan
repayments) to be allocated to the federal account used to
cover the federal share of extended benefit costs. The intent
is to speed up repayment of past Treasury advances made to
this account to cover federal extended and supplemental
benefit costs it could not finance currently. The temporary
0.2 percent addition to the FUTA tax rate, imposed to repay
these advances, will be terminated sooner as the result of this
change.
The Congress also agreed to extend unemployment com
pensation for additional weeks beyond those covered by
regular and extended UI benefits. This temporary program
of Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC) will be
available from about mid-September 1982 to March 31,
1983. The program provides FSC to claimants who ex
hausted their UI benefit entitlement and who qualified for
regular benefits with at least 20 weeks of base-period
employment (or an equivalent distribution of base-period
earnings). They may draw up to 10 weeks of FSC in states
which have paid extended benefits at any time since June 1,
1982, up to 8 weeks in states with an averaged insured
unemployment rate of at least 3.5 percent over a 13-week
period, and up to 6 weeks in all other states. These additional
benefits will be financed out of federal general revenues and
therefore have no effect on the basic financing of UI.

NOTES
1. Employees also help finance benefits in Alabama, Alaska, and New
Jersey.
2. Taxable payrolls accounted for only about a third of total payrolls as
estimated for 1981.
3. Prior to 1972, only Alaska and Pennsylvania actually had to use bor
rowed funds to pay benefits; Michigan borrowed funds in 1958 but never
had to use them to pay benefits. Several other states qualified for loans in
the late 1950s but chose not to borrow.
4. Congress had under consideration in August 1982 a proposed in
crease in both the FUTA tax base and rate, to become effective in 1983
(see Supplementary Note).
5. The tax credit allowed to an employer is for state UI taxes paid up to
the 2.7 percent level, but if the employer pays a state tax that is lower
than 2.7 percent because of experience rating, the full 2.7 percent credit
is allowed. All employers qualify for the full credit on this basis.

6. Nonprofit and governmental employers are not subject to the federal
tax.
7. Annual federal grants to the states cover all their UI program ad
ministrative costs.
8. The state and federal governments share equally the costs of extend
ed benefits paid to insured unemployed workers who exhaust their
regular state UI benefits during periods of high unemployment.
9. The minimum solvency standard is 3.58 percent of total payrolls,
representing the highest 12-month benefit-cost ratio experienced by the
state since 1956. That occurred in the 12 months ending November 1975.
The ABC tax rate for an employer is calculated by the following for
mula:
.25 (.0358 x total payroll-current balance)
total payroll
10. An NEC tax applies as long as the total state fund (excluding debt
outstanding) remains below a specified solvency position; as the fund
rises sufficiently towards that level, the NEC rate declines and becomes
zero when it reaches or exceeds that level.

11. Federal borrowing and repayment rules were stiffened after this ex
perience.
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12. Although repayment was not required until the following November,
the funds available at the time would have gone to pay benefits in 1980
instead, leaving none for loan repayment, and the FUTA tax rate in
creases would have begun in 1980. The new loans necessary in 1980 were
not due for repayment until November 1982. Full repayment of the
earlier debt, therefore, postponed FUTA rate increases for two more
years.
13. Provisions governing loans and their repayment are contained in Ti
tle XII of the Social Security Act and Section 3302 of the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act; the repayment provisions were most recently
amended by Section 2406 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1981 (P.L. 97-35). Additional amendments were enacted by trhe Congress
in August 1982 (see Supplementary Note).
14. The FUTA rate increase occurs through a reduction in the 2.7 per
cent tax rate allowed as credit against the full FUTA tax rate of 3.4 per
cent.
15. The added solvency rate is the amount, if any, by which the average
state UI tax rate (based on taxable wages) for the year falls short of the
average annual benefit outlay of the prior five years as a percent of tax
able payrolls for the year. The penalty and solvency rates combined may
not exceed 2.7 percent, the amount of the full tax credit normally allow
ed. An amendment enacted in August 1982 will eliminate the solvency
rate increase.
16. Congress amended the repayment provisions in August 1982 (see
Supplementary Note) to allow states to pay the penalty tax amounts out
of state UI funds instead of FUTA tax increases.
17. These unemployment estimates were developed by the Bureau of
Employment and Training of the Michigan Department of Labor in
cooperation with staff of the Department of Management and Budget
and consultants at the University of Michigan. State unemployment
estimates have been made annually as a basis for planning data called for
by the full employment policy statute in Michigan.
18. The projected maximum WBA payable rises 7 percent each year to
match this assumed rate of increase in the average wage level. The max
imum is expected to rise from $197 in 1982 to about $211 in 1983, $226 in
1984, and $241 in 1985.
19. A negative balance occurs when the employer's tax payments from
the CBC and ABC tax components have not been enough to cover past
benefit charges.
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20. The maximum tax rate has been 9.0 percent since 1981. It was 8.5 in
1980, 8.0 in 1979, and 7.5 in 1978.
21. Material in this paragraph is based on data supplied by MESC.
22. See Timothy L. Hunt, The Business Climate in Michigan
(Kalamazoo, MI: The W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research, 1982).
23. The penalty rate would rise to 1.5 for 1986, 1.8 for 1987, and so on.
The maximum solvency rate that could be added each year would,
accordingly, be lower since the combined 2.7 percent limit would still
apply.
24. The proceeds of the FUTA penalty tax paid each year apply to reduce
the interest-free portion of the debt and therefore do not ease the effort
required to reach the interest-free level.
25. In August 1982, Congress enacted an increase in the full FUTA tax
rate and in the tax credit allowed (see Supplementary Note). Suspension
of experience rating therefore will require the higher rate equivalent to
the full tax credit allowed.
26. The State of Washington uses this approach and is currently taxing
all employers at 3.0 percent of taxable wages ($10,800 in 1982). Utah and
Wyoming also provide for such suspension.

27. Final Report of the Unemployment Insurance Financing System
Working Group, April 5, 1982, p. 1.
28. Significant Provisions of State Unemployment Insurance Laws, July
4, 1982, U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Ad
ministration, Unemployment Insurance Service. Includes Puerto Rico,
which taxes total payrolls.
29. Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws, U.S. Depart
ment of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, updated to
January 1982, pp. 2-25 and 2-26, Table 201. Includes New Jersey, which
sets its taxable wage base at 28 times the state's average weekly wageequivalent to about 54 percent of the annual average wage.
30. Significant Provisions, op. cit.
31. See Paul J. Mackin, Benefit Financing in Unemployment Insurance:
A Problem of Balancing Responsibilities (Kalamazoo, MI: The W. E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1978), pp. 72-74.
32. Senate Bill 581 contains these proposals.
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33. These provisions are contained in Section 2404, P.L. 97-35 and Sec
tion 102, P.L. 96-499, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts of 1981
and 1980, respectively.
34. Significant Provisions, op. cit.
35. Prior to the change in formula, the weekly benefit in Michigan came
to 60 percent of the claimant's gross weekly wage at levels below the
maximum. The 50 to 60 percent range indicated for present benefits is
based on gross wages before taking account of withheld federal and state
income taxes and social security contributions. Some Michigan cities also
require a local income tax deduction, which would lower the net wage
and the benefit amount. A tax reduction, such as the 10 percent federal
income tax cut effective July 1982, increases the net wage and benefit
amount. The state income tax was raised for several months beginning
April 1982; its rise and fall also affect the weekly benefit payment,
though usually by only small amounts.
36. Significant Provisions, op. cit. More liberal duration provisions in
clude those with a regular duration maximum above 26 weeks, uniform
duration of 26 weeks, and a variable duration formula more generous
than Michigan's which provides 3 weeks of benefits for 4 weeks of baseperiod employment up to the 26-weeks maximum.
37. The average of annual benefit outlays during the years 1980 to 1984,
including projected outlays for the last three of those years, equals $1.4
billion, 7.8 percent of taxable payrolls estimated for 1985. Projected
state tax revenues for that year total about $900 million, 5 percent of tax
able payrolls.
38. Repeal of the FUTA solvency rate provision by the Congress in
August 1982 (see Supplementary Note) makes pursuit of this goal irrele
vant.
39. At the end of 1982, the projected outstanding debt of $2,204 million
includes interest-bearing debt of $641 million. By the end of 1985, the
projected FUTA penalty taxes paid in 1983-1985 will reduce the interestfree portion of the debt from its 1982 balance of $1,563 million to an
estimated level of about $1,250 million. The interest-bearing portion
then would be about $475 million, with all changes taken as shown.
40. The required level is about $1,660 million which represents the
average (2.5 percent) of annual benefit-cost ratios (actual and projected)
in the 1980-1984 period, based on total payrolls, applied to estimated
1985 total payrolls. The total state revenues projected with the changes il
lustrated on Table 5 add to about $1.5 billion.

81
41. The other key capping requirement calls for an outstanding debt
level, as of September 30, 1985, no higher than that of three years earlier.
By raising the $160 million additional revenues noted, that requirement
would probably be met as well.
42. FUTA amendments enacted by the Congress in August 1982 will ease
some debt repayment and interest provisions along these lines (see Sup
plementary Note).
43. UI Outlook, FY 1983 President©s Budget, Midsession Review,
prepared by U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Ad
ministration, Unemployment Insurance Service, Division of Actuarial
Services, Washington, DC, July 30, 1982, p. 17.
44. See Unemployment Compensation: Final Report, National Commis
sion on Unemployment Compensation, July 1980, p. 79.
45. The national trigger was on and extended benefits were payable in all
states when the national insured unemployment rate (seasonally ad
justed) over a 13-week period averaged at least 4.5 percent. A 1981
amendment of the federal law eliminated the national trigger; only state
triggers now operate this program.
46. Federal supplemental benefits, which were provided to unemployed
exhaustees of regular and extended benefits, were financed by general
revenues after March 1977.
47. Joseph M. Decker, Unemployment Insurance Financing: An Evalua
tion (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Policy
Research, 1981), pp. 40-42, 44ff; Mackin, op. cit., pp. 85-90.
48. A national program of disaster unemployment assistance now exists,
financed by general revenues, to compensate workers unemployed as the
direct result of major natural disasters (floods, earthquakes, hurricanes,
etc.), as declared by the President. Proponents of national UI rein
surance or cost-equalization schemes sometimes refer to these ideas as
means of protecting against economic disasters.
49. Unemployment Compensation: Final Report, op. cit., p. 102.
50. Saul J. Blaustein, Job and Income Security for Unemployed
Workers (Kalamazoo, MI: The W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research, 1981).
51. The proposed three-tiered restructuring of the UI program is accom
panied by a major reemphasis on and expansion of reemployment and
adjustment assistance.
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52. An increase in the federal taxable wage base to $7,000 beginning 1983
(see Supplementary Note) would probably raise the amount of penalty
taxes payable by approximately 15 percent.
53. Special federal benefit programs, financed entirely by general
revenues, are provided to compensate for unemployment resulting from
certain types of dislocations, usually in specified industries. The most
prominent of these has been the Trade Readjustment Allowance pro
gram for workers laid off because of import competition. These pro
grams lie outside the UI system and have been criticized for being
discriminatory among the unemployed, duplicative, and more generous
than UI. See Murray Rubin, "The Proliferation of Special Employee
Protection Programs," in Unemployment Compensation: Studies and
Research, Vol. 3, National Commission on Unemployment Compensa
tion, July 1980.
54. Significant Provisions, op. cit. Excludes three jurisdictions which did
not experience rate in 1982.
55. Once the state fund reaches a specified solvency level, a zero tax rate
can be assigned.
56. Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws, op. cit., pp.
2-27 and 2-28, Table 202.
57. Significant Provisions, op. cit.
58. Ibid.

